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Veritas

ABSD IN THE KOREAN WAR: PART IV

얼어 죽을
작정인가?





Veritas

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Cover Illustration:

This Leaflet was created by the 1st RB&L and depicts a freezing North Korean soldier huddled against an icy wind. Promoting defection, the Korean text reads: "Do You Want To Perish?"

The **Azimuth** of the USASOC History Office



USASOC History Office priority shifts in 2010 remained unchanged for 2011. Thus, the extension of "ARSOF in Korea" caused a second order effect. It provided more time for strategic Psywar and Special Forces veterans to "come up on the net." This caused third order effects. The strategic Psywar issue got so big that it had to be divided into two, which expanded the "ARSOF in Korea" series to six *Veritas* issues and pushed the project into 2012. Command Group projects reached the 2010 level, but frequency, complexity, and size were very different. Quarterly issues of *Veritas* went by the wayside in 2010.

On other fronts progress was made: ARSOF Senior Leader Papers collections, veteran interviews, and the development of a searchable digital archive in the History Support Center. One reminder: Personal photos, memorabilia, and interviews were provided for use in *Veritas* **ONLY**. A special thanks to the 1st RB&L families and veterans who provided personal papers, records, memorabilia, and photographs that enhanced the strategic Psywar in Korea project.

The Far East Command (FECOM) strategic Psywar mission was assigned to 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group (1st RB&L) by Department of Army in August 1951. This issue covers the tasks given to the 1st RB&L Advance Echelon (ADVON) by the FECOM G-2 Psywar Section. The 3rd Reproduction Company was moved

into the FECOM Print Facility in Motosumiyoshi. The Psywar group internally reorganized to address theater priorities—Radio Tokyo and *Voice of the UN Command* and rebuilding the *Korean Broadcasting System (KBS)*. The 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) sent teams to Pusan and Seoul to start that work. The impetus behind the rebirth of Psywar in the Army during the Korean War was Brigadier General Robert A. McClure. Knowing something about him and understanding how his staff (Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare) functioned will help readers appreciate the uphill battles waged in the Pentagon.

Issue 1:2012 will complete strategic Psywar in Korea. The antenna riggers, the move of the 4th MRB company headquarters to Seoul, and the expanded *KBS* station rehabilitation are included. Warning leaflets and the Allied bombing campaign that led to Operations "HOAX" and "EYEWASH" and spectrum support of South Korean Independence Day flow naturally in order. Articles on Tokyo's May Day riots in 1952 and Radio *Pusan* post-Armistice wrap up the FECOM Psywar mission. The establishment of a U.S. Army Psywar Center at Fort Bragg, NC, by Colonel Charles H. Karlstad and the activation of 10th Special Forces provide Psychological Warfare perspectives beyond 1st RB&L in FECOM. Thanks for your support. CHB

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REBUILDING PSYWAR

An Introduction

by Kenneth Finlayson

The U.S. Army in Korea in 1950 was in many respects indistinguishable from the one that fought World War II. The divisions in Korea were organized and equipped in the same way as the Army of 1945. The post-war demobilization shrank the Army dramatically and there was little in the way of innovation and fielding of new equipment in the 1940s. When the Korean War began, huge stocks of surplus WWII equipment were reissued to the forces fighting in the Far East. With the possible exception of “Mickey Mouse” boots, the troops that landed at Inch ‘on used essentially the same equipment as their predecessors at the Battle of the Bulge. However, in one area, psychological warfare (Psywar), there was a revitalization of a virtually moribund capability that resulted in the rapid development of new systems and the establishment of a new Army training center. With the exception of a small cadre of WWII veterans at Fort Riley, Kansas, the Army had no active element to either develop the doctrine and techniques of Psywar or to test and field new equipment. The rebirth of Psywar during the Korean War had a significant and lasting impact on Army Special Operations.¹

From the beginning of the war in June 1950, the Army recognized the need to counter the well-developed and pervasive Communist propaganda. The end result was the Army acquiring the capability to conduct full-spectrum Psywar targeting both friendly and enemy populations. Using all available media, the initial emphasis was on

tactical Psywar featuring loudspeakers situated near the front lines and aerial-delivered leaflets directed at enemy troops. By mid-1951, the Army built a capability to conduct strategic Psywar through precisely crafted radio broadcasts into North Korea and China through stations established in Japan and South Korea. Simultaneously, the Army institutionalized Psywar capability by creating the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) in 1951 and establishing the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina in 1952.

This issue of *Veritas* looks at the implementation of full spectrum Psywar as it developed in the Far East Theater and the concurrent establishment of the psychological warfare training base in the United States. It covers in detail the arrival in Japan of the 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group (RB&L) in support of Far East Command (FECOM) and the unit’s important role in the operation of *Radio Tokyo*. The 3rd Reproduction Company (3rd Repro) provided the off-set printing capability for the 1st RB&L. The mission of the 3rd Repro is told by the men who served in it, which also paints a picture of the daily life of soldiers in Occupied Japan. This issue documents the establishment of the OCPW as it developed out of the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) and features a biography of Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure, a prominent figure in the early history of Army Psywar who was instrumental in the rebirth of Army Special Operations during the Korean War era.



The UN delegates to the Korean Armistice talks prior to take-off for the initial meeting at Kaesong on 10 July 1952. From L to R: Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, USN; Major General Laurence C. Craigie, USAF; Major General Paik Sun Yup, Republic of Korea Army; Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN, Chief Delegate; General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA, Commander-in-Chief of United Nations Command; Major General Henry I. Hodes, USA.



2LT Eddie Deerfield produces a radio broadcast featuring South Korean President Syngman Rhee. The broadcast originated from HLKA of the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS).



LTC Homer E. Shields, commander of the 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, reviews the script of a Chinese language radio broadcast with Lansa, a Chinese actress and linguist employed by the United Nations Command. This photo is from an article published in *Collier's* magazine, December 13, 1952.

This issue divides the history of the 1st RB&L in the Korean War into three distinct phases, the arrival of the lead elements, support to the UN negotiations and the arrival and employment of the main body, corresponding to the evolving mission of the unit. Initially, the advanced echelon (ADVON) of the 1st RB&L deployed in July 1951 from the United States to Tokyo, Japan. The first mission was to support the United Nations negotiation team at Kaesong. Sending teletype messages back to Far East Command (FECOM) in Japan, the 1st RB&L personnel (predominately journalists and scriptwriters) became “sources close to General Ridgway” in the ongoing coverage of the negotiations. They helped to counter the propaganda generated by English and Australian “fellow-travelers,” pro-Communist sympathizers broadcasting English language messages from the site of the talks. Those members remaining in Japan were focused on the unit’s second priority, preparing to receive the main body of the Group when it arrived.

The two principal subordinate units in the 1st RB&L were the 3rd Repro and the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC). The 3rd Repro personnel arrived ahead of their primary piece of equipment, the state-of-the-art Harris offset printing press. The presses, purchased on the civilian market, arrived with the last elements of the Group in September 1951. In the interim, the 3rd Repro used the less efficient Webendorfer presses and operated from their new print facility in Motosumiyoshi. The presses were dedicated to producing leaflets.

The major function of the 3rd Repro was to prepare leaflets to be airdropped or delivered by artillery. The 1st RB&L artists designed the leaflets in Tokyo and printed them at the Motosumiyoshi facility. While the 3rd Repro established its printing operations in Japan, its sister unit in the 1st RB&L, the 4th MRBC, established its radio systems in Japan and South Korea.

The unit established *Radio Tokyo* in support of FECOM. One of the first missions of the 4th MRBC was broadcasting radio messages into North Korea as early warning of the U.S. Air Force bombing campaign. This humanitarian



BG Robert A. McClure in London during World War II. BG McClure was the driving force behind the post-war formation of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare and the establishment of the Psywar Center at Fort Bragg, NC in 1952.

gesture was coordinated by the officers of the company who received teletype messages of scheduled air strikes. The warnings were broadcast one hour prior to the attacks in an effort to reduce civilian casualties. The 4th MRBC continued to support *Radio Tokyo* while moving into the second phase of its operations which involved deploying elements of the company to South Korea.

Until the end of the war, the 1st RB&L continued to employ the full spectrum of Psywar assets in theater. The development of this capability was facilitated by the establishment of the Psywar Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where the training foundation for rebuilding the Army Psywar capability was accomplished. The revitalization of Psywar was due almost entirely to the vision of one man, BG Robert A. McClure.

While the Psychological Warfare Division existed on the Army staff, it was just that, a staff element without the capability to develop the doctrine necessary to train Psywar personnel. Fortunately, in BG McClure, General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Chief of Psychological Warfare in WWII, the Army had an experienced and aggressive champion for Psywar. BG McClure campaigned for the rejuvenation of the Army’s Psywar capability, and in 1952 his tireless efforts were rewarded with the establishment of the Psywar Center at Fort Bragg, NC. BG McClure played a critical role in the establishment of the Psywar Center and School (PWS) which became the foundation for modern Army Special Operations Forces.

From the need to counter the Communist propaganda effort arose the realization that the Army needed to commit assets and training to Psywar. The establishment of the Psywar Center set the stage for the permanent incorporation of Psywar into the Army organization. Today’s Military Information Support Operations units derive their history from these beginnings. ♣

Kenneth Finlayson is the USASOC Deputy Command Historian. He earned his PhD from the University of Maine, and is a retired Army officer. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, special operations aviation, and World War II special operations units.

Endnotes

- 1 In the years after the Korean War, Psywar became Psychological Operations, a term that was used until 2010. The current proposed doctrinal term is Military Information Support Operations (MISO) which encompasses today’s modern doctrine and capabilities.

A small civilian-led G-2 Psywar Section, responsible for Far East Command (FECOM) planning from the Philippines to China, had been “fighting tactical fires” since North Korea invaded the South on 25 June 1950. For over a year they had scrambled from one requirement to another. The tasks increased markedly when the FECOM headquarters was dual-hatted as the United Nations Command (UNC). In the midst of the Asian war the U.S. Army was hustling to rebuild tactical and strategic Psywar capabilities.¹

Constant pressure from FECOM in the late spring of 1951 prompted Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure, the Army Chief of Psychological Warfare (Psywar), to accelerate the shipment of the 1st RB&L to Tokyo. Because the unit was not fully manned and had acute print and radio broadcast equipment shortages, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Homer E. Shields, a WWII Psywar veteran and the commander of the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1st RB&L), divided his element into three echelons. A small advance echelon (ADVON) departed by air for Tokyo in early June. The main body followed by sea in July. A rear echelon, after being trained on newly acquired equipment, crated it up, and accompanied the cargo aboard ship in September 1951.²

The purpose of this article is to explain the priority missions the 1st RB&L ADVON had when they arrived in Japan. The Psywar group needed a “home” for its 3rd Reproduction [Repro] Company.³ In accordance with 1950s Psywar doctrine, the Repro Company of an RB&L was to co-locate with theater print facilities.⁴ But, J. Woodall Greene, General Douglas A. MacArthur’s WWII Chief of Psywar, recalled to active service from retirement, had a more pressing problem. UNC needed an official voice at the Armistice negotiations site. Why a Psywar officer was to be committed to that critical mission is the crux of this presentation.

Talks to set the conditions had begun at Kaesong in the Communist-controlled area. The United Nations Command (UNC) did not have an official news presence on site. North Korea and China brought two seasoned, highly skilled, sympathetic British and Australian journalists with Party news personnel to help them with publicity. These two Western “fellow travelers” were in the official party. Conditional to starting Armistice talks the Communists had stipulated that “free press” representatives be barred from initial meetings where points of discussion and an agenda would be set. Thus, the Communists took the Psywar “high ground” since the leftist English-speaking

Insamgwan in Kaesong, near the Armistice talks site.

(Photo courtesy of John Rich)



THE 1ST RB&L ADVANCE TACKLES FAR EAST COMMAND PRIORITIES

by Charles H. Briscoe



The 1st RB&L Advance Party leaves Fort Riley. **L to R standing:** 2LT Arthur E. Holch, CPT Frederick P. Laffey, 2LT William F. Brown II, PFC David Loy, PFC Gudmund Berge, unknown, SGT Robert Herguth; **L to R: squatting:** PFC R. Henry Cavenah, PFC George, PFC James McCrory, and PFC Joseph P. Dabney.

correspondents served as spokesmen for international media at the beginning. The Allies had no one.

The U.S. State and Defense Departments, UNC and FECOM were caught "flat-footed." American agencies soon learned that to counter Communist propaganda effectively they had to evaluate the consequences of all actions, anticipate reactions, and have well-grounded responses to keep "a step ahead" in the Cold War of competing ideologies. The Communists proved to be tough opponents who treated Western diplomatic protocols with disdain. Totally unaware of the problem when they arrived, Korea seemed a long way from Tokyo to the 1st RB&L ADVON.

Second Lieutenant (2LT) William F. Brown II related: "Wearing our combat gear with summer khaki uniforms and carrying duffle bags, we boarded a chartered Douglas

DC-4 airplane in California for Tokyo. As we clambered off the aircraft at an airport near the Japanese capital, a convertible with its top down drove up. Its American driver in civilian clothes had a beautiful woman with him. His only greeting was: 'So, you really did make it. Report to the Empire House,' and off he drove. Our officer-in-charge [OIC] commandeered an American military bus with a Japanese driver to take us into the city. It was Saturday and few people were working. When we got to the Empire House, nobody knew we were coming. My first job Monday morning was to write a press release for a Colonel Dahlquist who was changing jobs. I don't know whether it was good or bad because a few days later I was sent to Korea."⁵

Colonel (COL) Greene, the former civilian head of G-2 Psywar, selected LT Bill Brown, a Princeton psychology graduate (Class of 1950) who had been a *Look* magazine writer for a short time, to cover the Armistice negotiations.⁶ "Why I was selected was never explained. I was told to pack my duffle bag and get to Korea. I caught military air 'hops' into Pusan and Seoul and 'hitched' a jeep ride to Kaesong. The [Armistice] talks had begun three days before I got to the UN military 'base camp,'" said Brown.⁷ He was unaware that the Western correspondents had been blocked from covering the initial proceedings.




The 1st RB&L Group did not have an official distinctive unit insignia (DUI). The soldiers wore the U.S. Army Far East Command or the General Headquarters (GHQ) shoulder sleeve insignia (SSI) on their uniforms.



Far East Command SSI

The tea house at Kaesong served as the site for the initial negotiations.





2LT William F. Brown II lived at the UN Base Camp near Munsan-ni. Left is Assistant S-3 1LT Robert D. B. Carlisle.



2LT William J. Brennan, Quartermaster Corps, replaced 2LT Brown at the Armistice talks.



UN vehicles marked with white flags parked below the negotiations site. Communist transportation was parked above to blatantly demonstrate superiority.



Kaesong, an ancient capital of Korea, was controlled by the North Koreans. Thus, the UN military base camp was established at Munsan ni where the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team and the 2nd and 4th Ranger Companies had conducted an airborne assault as part of Operation TOMAHAWK on 23 March 1951.



Daily, the UN Liaison Group (all military) was escorted to the Kaesong conference site by North Korean soldiers.

On opening day the Western news media representatives had been denied access to the site by the North Koreans. They watched as the Party press representatives and two sympathetic Western journalists tramped into the negotiation site. Therefore, only one perspective was being presented to the world. By the time LT Brown arrived, the UNC had lodged formal objections to the overlooked caveat and were scrambling to accommodate the Western journalists at a tent city near Munsan-ni. Despite improved billeting, ready access to radio teletype communications, transportation, and on-site military censors, the absence of hard information as “staffers” haggled over Armistice agenda topics upset the reporters.

Fact-starved journalists, pressured by editors back home, quickly turned to Communist disinformation being broadcast in English from P’yongyang and Peking and to the two “fellow traveler” newsmen who

accompanied the North Korean and Chinese delegations. These leftist Westerners “held court,” sharing lopsided information with the international press corps facing print deadlines at home. BG Frank A. Allen, the FECOM Public Information Officer [PIO], and BG William P. Nuckols, the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) PIO, sent to plug the gap, struggled to counter the Communist Psywar campaign.⁸ Having walked into this confusion, 2LT Bill Brown described the UN camp and the daily routine in a *Proper Gander* article.

In front of an infantry regimental headquarters was the Allied ‘peace camp’—a tent city of thirty or forty large tents and a dozen small VIP ones in the middle of an apple orchard. “It had its own movie theater with a sandbagged generator. The small projector was beset by a million nocturnal mosquitos. There was a barber shop and 48-hour laundry service,” explained Brown. “Every

War and the news correspondent...



The UN Press Camp contained Allied civilian press reporters, military correspondents from *Stars and Stripes*, *Pacific*, command PIO representatives, and unit news personnel. Note the UN Correspondent shoulder patch.

Correspondents from both the Communist countries and the UN Command size each other up.
(Photo courtesy of John Rich)



The Eighth Army [EUSA] 217th Car Company was dedicated to transport Allied military representatives and UN correspondents to and from the negotiations site. All vehicles had white flags conspicuously mounted.



Alan Winnington (rear), correspondent for the *London Daily Worker*, denounced by Parliament as a traitor, was one of two Western journalists allowed to visit MG William F. Dean, the ranking United Nations officer held captive in P'yongyang since August 1950. Australian Wilfred Burchette (center), working for the *Paris Ce Soir* and *L'Humanite*, was the other Western visitor allowed MG Dean. The two English-speaking leftists regularly "held court" at Kaesong for news-starved Western journalists. With them is *NBC News* correspondent John Rich (far right). (Photo courtesy of John Rich)





UN representatives for the initial Armistice negotiations were selected by General Matthew B. Ridgway and Vice Admiral (VAdm) C. Turner Joy, Commander, Naval Forces, Far East (NFFE). L to R: Major General (MG) Henry I. Hodes, Deputy Chief of Staff, Eighth Army (EUSA); MG Laurence C. Cragie, Vice Commander, Far East Air Force (FEAF); Admiral Joy, MG Paik Sun-yup, Republic of Korea (ROK) I Corps commander; and Rear Admiral (RAdm) Arleigh A. Burke, Deputy Chief of Staff, NFFE.

(Photo courtesy of John Rich)



Vice Admiral, NFFE, Admiral C. Turner Joy arrives at Kaesong. Admiral Joy served as the senior UN delegate to the truce talks from July 1951 to May 1952. Note the U.S.A.F. Sikorsky H-5 helicopter in the background.

(Photo courtesy of John Rich)

morning and evening the [Allied] delegates met in a tent marked 'Conference' to discuss Communist claims and 'quarterback' the next day's activities."⁹

"Lieutenant Bill [William J.] Brennan [Brown's replacement] and I, wearing .45 pistols, rode out to the Kaesong negotiations house in a jeep flying white flags. We drove down a road into the demilitarized zone [DMZ] cordoned by North Korean soldiers with burp guns," said LT Brown. "As we sped through the 'gauntlet' of stone-faced Communist troops Bill joked that the U.S. Army would rush in with tanks to get our bodies if we were attacked."¹⁰

The initial conference site was a well-known Chinese restaurant in Korea. "In its present state it wouldn't rate a Class B permit in the States," Brown wrote. "Painted walls and ceiling are peeling. The garden is overgrown. The vines choke out the flowers that were probably carefully cultivated two summers ago. Each Allied negotiator's statement is usually read from a prepared script and then translated into Korean and Chinese. The discussions move slowly, and the tone is usually one of moderate iciness."¹¹

"Outside on a big porch Communist newsmen—mostly Korean and Chinese—cluster with an Englishman named [Alan] Winnington from the London [socialist] *Daily Worker* and his sidekick [Wilfred] Burchette from the Parisian [leftist] *Ce Soir* [and *L'Humanite*]. Both arrived from Peking. In another place are maybe a dozen allied newsmen. Everyone is engaged in speculation; everyone waits for the big 'break' to come. It doesn't. After a few posed pictures at the end of the day, the Communists pile in their Russian-made jeeps and zoom off. The whir of helicopter blades

announces the departure of the UN delegates."¹² This use of air transportation countered the dominant vehicle parking position taken by the Communists.

"After a few times waiting outside the building for hours to receive the official statement and then hurrying back to [military] camp to type a broadcast for the *Voice of the UN Command* [VUNC] in Tokyo, I started going to the Press Camp to await the PIO release. Then, I wrote my report and sent it by radio teletype to FECOM G-2 Psywar. To add credence to Tokyo broadcasts they referred to me as a 'voice close to General Ridgway,'" chuckled LT Brown. "The closest I ever got to him was photographing his tent in the UN base camp at Munsan-ni. But, I did meet the FECOM PIO [BG Frank A. Allen], who got me assigned as 1st RB&L LNO [liaison officer] after covering the negotiations."¹³

2LT Bill Brennan replaced Brown in mid-August. Shortly after the Communists broke off discussions on 23 August 1951 LT Brown left for Tokyo via Pusan. The breakdown of negotiations was the first of many. The prevailing excuse was alleged "UN violations" of the Communist-controlled "neutral" Kaesong perimeter.¹⁴

By then, the 1st RB&L ADVON OIC, Captain Frederick P. Laffey, had arranged to co-locate 3rd Repro at the nearest FECOM print facility, the Printing and Publications Center in Motosumiyoshi, a suburb of Kawasaki, halfway between Tokyo and Yokohama. The 3rd Repro would remain assigned to 1st RB&L.¹⁵ Thus, when the USNS *General A.W. Brewster* docked at the Yokohama pier, the three officers and fifty-four men of the 1st RB&L print unit were loaded aboard busses to Kawasaki while the rest of the Psywar group went to Tokyo.¹⁶



Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke reads outside his tent in the VIP area of the UN Base Camp near Munsan-ni.

Necessity drove the requirement to dedicate a Psywar officer to cover Armistice negotiations activities at Kaesong, and then Panmunjom. While it was tedious duty, the Communist use of sympathetic Western correspondents had to be countered by official UN reporting. A state of Cold War between West and East was now acknowledged. Americans at home faced a Congressionally-instigated, FBI-supported Red Scare that proved worse than the one after WWI. Since the Chinese intervention in late November 1950, the UN Security Council, again having Soviet representation, sought to end the fighting in Korea. Restoration of the *status quo antebellum* north-south boundary along the 38th Parallel became the UN objective. Continual reunification rhetoric by President Syngman Rhee was regularly tamped down by the Americans to do this. Awaiting LTC Homer Shields' arrival were the challenges of establishing *Voice of the UN Command* (VUNC) using *Radio Tokyo* broadcasting time and the rebuild and oversight of the *Korean Broadcasting System* (KBS) in Korea. ♣


Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and the Lodge Act.

Endnotes

- 1 Retired Colonel J. Woodall Greene, the head of FECOM G-2 Psywar Division, had been General (GEN) Douglas A. MacArthur's Psywar chief during WWII. He was recalled to active duty for the Korean War. Robert W. Jones, Jr. and Charles H. Briscoe, "The Proper Ganders": 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group; Strategic Psywar in Korea, 1951-1954," *Veritas*, 7:1 (2011), 26.
- 2 Memorandum from Colonel Edward J.F. Glavin, Acting Chief of Psychological Warfare, to Lieutenant Colonel Homer E. Shields, subject: Deployment of 1st RB&L, 15 May 1951, (National Archives, Record Group 319, Box 19, Entry 339); Message from Chief PSYWAR to Psywar Branch, Far East Command, subject: Urgent Personnel Needs, 27 May 1951, (NARA, Entry 339, Box 19, Record Group 319).
- 3 Infantry Captain Frederick P. Laffey led the 1st RB&L Advance Echelon (ADVON) to Japan. Identified members consisted of 2LT Arthur E. Holch, 2LT William F. Brown, II, PFC David Loy, PFC Gudmund Berge, CPL Robert Herguth, PFC R. Henry Cavenah, PFC George, PFC James McCrory, and PFC Joseph E. Dabney.

Thomas M. Klein, Robert Herguth, and Robert McConaughy, *Psychological Warfare in Korea: Life and Times in the First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group 1951-52* (Round Hill, VA: RHP Books, 2002), 30, hereafter cited as *Life and Times* 2002.

- 4 *History of the Far East Command Printing and Publications Center*, 3, 5, 8, 9; "Ideas in Action," *Stars & Stripes* (Tokyo) undated, Haynes Collection; U.S. Army Field Forces, Fort Monroe, VA. T/D [Table of Distribution] 250-1202, Reproduction Company, Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, dated 18 July 1950, Robert L. Darcy Collection, U.S. Army Heritage & Education Center, Carlisle, PA, hereafter cited as the Darcy Collection; *The 3rd Reproduction Company role in the 1st RB&L strategic mission was to produce leaflets and other printed propaganda material in support of Psywar operations in theater. According to doctrine, three elements determined where a Repro Company would be located: (1) the capability of U.S. Government printing plants in theater to produce Psywar products; (2) the availability of troop billeting nearby; (3) warehouse facilities to store paper and ink supplies and temporarily house finished printed products until pickup. Though 3rd Repro was a fixed base, non-mobile unit, its equipment was still transportable. U.S. Army General School. Psychological Warfare Division. Psywar Officers Course. PW 4554: Reproduction Company, PW-92-S-1 (1951), Darcy Collection.*
- 5 William F. Brown II, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 27 September 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; Bill Brown, "Personal Remarks," in Klein, McConaughy, and Anthony E. Severino, *Remembrances of the 1st RB&L Group: 57th Year Reunion, October 24, 2009*, 1, hereafter cited as *57th Year Reunion*.
- 6 Brown interview, 27 September 2010; Brown, "Personal Remarks," *57th Year Reunion*, 1.
- 7 Brown interview, 27 September 2010; Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*. United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC, US Army Center of Military History, 2005), 19, 20, 21. *A tent camp for UN negotiators was established at Munsan-ni twenty-five miles north of Seoul.*
- 8 Steven Casey, "Wilfred Burchette and the UN Command's Media Relations During the Korean War, 1951-1952," *Journal of Military History*, 74:3 (July 2010): 821-845.
- 9 Brown, "History in the Making: Tales from South Korea," *The Proper Gander*, 1: 16 (18 August 1951), 2, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, Tokyo, Japan, Charles R. Broderick Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as *The Proper Gander* with date and collection.
- 10 Brown interview, 27 September 2010; Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, 21; *Unknown to them, the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (ARCT) was on alert to rescue the UN Armistice negotiators at Kaesong.* Retired COL Robert I. Channon, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 14 September 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 11 Brown, "History in the Making: Tales from South Korea," *The Proper Gander*, 1:16 (18 August 1951), 2, Broderick Collection. *It was December 1951 when the North Koreans announced that MG William F. Dean, the commander of the first American troops in Korea (elements of the 24th Infantry Division), had been their prisoner since August 1950. He was the highest ranking UN officer in captivity and had been awarded the first Medal of Honor for Korea. His virtual isolation was interrupted only by visits from the leftist correspondents, Englishman Alan Winnington, London *Daily Worker*, and Australian Wilfred Burchette, a reporter for *L'Humanite* and *Ce Soir of Paris*. "International: Hero's Return" *Time*, 14 September 1953 at <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,858246,00.html> accessed 12 July 2011; "The Press: A Personal Question" *Time*, 8 August 1951 at <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,856875,00.html> accessed 12 July 2011; Matthew Seelinger, "Ordeal of the 'Walking General': MG William F. Dean in Korea," at <http://www.armyhistory.org/armyhistory.aspx?pgID=868&id=32&exCompID=32> accessed 9 September 2005; *In the early months of the Armistice negotiations, Burchett and Winnington were sometimes viewed by many Western correspondents as "barometers of Communist thinking around the conference table."* In 1952, Burchett was at the forefront of a Communist propaganda campaign that accused the United Nations of using germ warfare against North Korean and Chinese troops. Casey, "Wilfred Burchett and the UN Command's Media Relations During the Korean War, 1951-1952," 821-845.*
- 12 Brown, "History in the Making: Tales from South Korea," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 16, 18 August 1951, 2, Broderick Collection.
- 13 Brown interview, 27 September 2010; Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, 21.
- 14 "New Site for Peace Talks Indicated," *The Proper Gander*, 1:23 (19 September 1951), 4, Broderick Collection; *LT William Brennan had come with the 1st RB&L main body on 6 August 1951.* Headquarters, Camp Stoneman, CA, Special Orders Number 198 dated 17 July 1951, SUBJECT: Shipment No. 9040A. COL Homer E. Shields Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 15 U.S. Army Far East Command. *History of the Far East Command Printing and Publications Center* (Motosumiyoshi, Japan: FECOM Printing & Publications Center, August 1951), 3, 5, 8, 9.
- 16 *The FECOM Printing & Publications Center had absorbed the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) Adjutant General Publications Center in late June 1950.* *History of the Far East Command Printing and Publications Center*, 3, 5, 8, 9; "Ideas in Action," *Stars & Stripes* (Tokyo) undated, James B. Haynes Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; U.S. Army General School. Psychological Warfare Division. Psywar Officers Course. PW 4554: Reproduction Company, PW-92-S-1 (1951), Darcy Collection.



Rebuilding Psywar

The Psychological Warfare Division, the Office
of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, and the
Psywar School at Fort Riley, 1950-1951

by Jared M. Tracy

In October 1950, the *Army Navy Air Force Journal* reported that “while plans for psychological warfare in a future emergency have been in progress for the past five years . . . they were undoubtedly speeded up because of the Korean crisis.”¹ However, the claim of progress in planning for psychological warfare after World War II was a gross exaggeration. As a capability, psychological warfare (Psywar) was nearly non-existent after WWII. Only the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) had any real capability in the radio broadcasting arena. Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure, the Chief of Psychological Warfare in the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) during WWII, had advocated for Psywar with an aggressive letter-writing campaign since 1946, but saw little result for his efforts. In August 1950, Major General (MG) Charles L. Bolte, Army G-3, called McClure to the Pentagon to discuss rebuilding the Army’s Psywar capability. Pressured by Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, the G-3 established a Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) two months after war broke out in Korea.²

BG McClure’s WWII experience as head of censorship, publicity, and psychological warfare, and his postwar experience as chief of information control and re-education in Germany, made him the obvious candidate to rebuild the U.S. Army’s Psywar capability. As Chief of the Psychological



MRBC soldiers attached to First U.S. Army broadcasting surrender appeals to German soldiers. WWII MRBCs provided the organizational and operational foundation for the Korean War-era L&L Companies and MRBCs. This photo was included in the Intelligence School’s 1947 report which outlined a provisional Combat Psychological Warfare Detachment.

Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Chief of PWD/SHAEF in 1944-1945 and the Information Control Division in 1945-1947, became Chief of the Psychological Warfare Division, G-3 in September 1950 and Chief of the Office of Psychological Warfare in January 1951.

Previous page: A common set-up of tactical Psywar units in Europe during WWII, a loudspeaker system is mounted on an M5A1 Light Tank, along with the 37 mm main gun and three .30 cal machine guns.

Warfare Division, G-3, he had three overarching priorities that he addressed simultaneously. First, he wanted to elevate the PWD to Special Staff status at the Pentagon. Second, he needed to coordinate with Headquarters, Army Field Forces (AFF), Fort Monroe, Virginia, to activate new tactical and strategic Psywar units from existing Tables of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E) and Tables of Distribution (T/D). Finally, the new units had to be manned, trained, equipped, and deployed to theater commands and field armies in the Far East and Europe.

Initially, BG McClure had few resources to accomplish these critical tasks other than the lessons of WWII. For organization, troop strength, and equipment for Psywar units, he referenced T/O&E 30-47, dated 15 December 1943 and amended on 22 June 1944. These documents established the template for the Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) and provided for twenty officers and one hundred-forty enlisted soldiers (including linguists, radio operators and engineers, printers, loudspeaker announcers, and others), twenty-four trucks ranging in size from quarter-ton to two and a half-tons, two Davidson Duplicator Presses, SCR-696 and SCR-698 Radio Sets, four AN/UIQ-1 Public Address Sets, and other mission-essential equipment.³ This T/O&E provided Psywar planners the starting point from which to man and equip new units.

In addition to T/O&E 30-47, McClure examined some of the Psywar studies conducted by the Army in the interwar period, which also focused on the organization and operations of WWII MRBCs.⁴ In September 1947, the Department of General Subjects (DGS), Intelligence School



at the Army Ground General School, Fort Riley, Kansas, completed the study *Tactical Psychological Warfare*. The report determined that radio was “a strategic weapon and had no place in a purely tactical psychological warfare unit.” It also recommended that the War Department establish a provisional Psywar unit called a Combat Psychological Warfare Detachment (CPWD) for “purely tactical operations.” The CPWD would employ loudspeakers and leaflets, though “higher headquarters” might permit them to use mobile short-range radios.⁵

The total number of personnel within the proposed CPWD’s subordinate sections (Headquarters, Intelligence, Publications, and Loudspeaker) was eleven officers and eighty enlisted personnel. The provisional unit loosely resembled the structure of the future Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company. The 1947 report revealed the Intelligence School’s initiative in developing Psywar organization and doctrine, and influenced BG McClure’s selection of Fort Riley for a Psychological Warfare Division and School in 1950.

Prior to September 1950, the U.S. Army only had seven experienced Psywar officers on active duty and one twenty-four-man Tactical Information Detachment (TID), activated at Fort Riley in June 1947. In 1950 the Army General School assumed operational control over the TID with the 47th Army Engineer Camouflage Battalion supervising its training. In May 1950, the TID transferred to the Army General School (AGS), 5021st Army Special Unit (ASU), for administration, quarters, and rations.⁶

By late-September, United Nations forces were sweeping northward up the Korean peninsula. As Chief, PWD, BG McClure’s most pressing issue was deploying a tactical Psywar unit to the Far East Theater of Operations. Assured that additional personnel and equipment would arrive soon, the understrength, underequipped, and minimally trained TID deployed to support Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) in Korea in October 1950. So that its organizational and operational needs would be met, the TID was re-designated the 1st L&L Company in November 1950.⁷ With the TID/1st L&L awaiting more personnel and equipment in Korea, McClure shifted focus to the complicated tasks of organizing, manning, training, equipping, and eventually deploying additional Psywar units. To overcome the obvious shortage of personnel and units in the active component, he turned to the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR).

Although the Army had inactivated all of its Psywar units after WWII, the U.S. Army Reserve had demonstrated better foresight. In 1947, Colonel (COL) Garland H. Williams, a veteran of the Office of Strategic Services and commander of the 1173rd Military Intelligence Group (USAR) in New York, established a Psywar Section. On 22 November 1947, COL Ellsworth H. Gruber, an intelligence officer during WWII and printing supervisor at the New York *Daily News*, assumed command of the section. On 21 June 1949, the 1588th Psychological Warfare Battalion (Training) replaced the 1173rd’s Psywar Section and absorbed its personnel, including COL Gruber. A year later, 1588th personnel transferred to the 1118th Organized Reserve Army Service



A veteran of both world wars, COL Ellsworth H. Gruber (second from right, walking) commanded the 301st RB&L from October 1950 to August 1952. The 7721st RB&L, the 301st’s replacement in Mannheim, credited COL Gruber with being “instrumental in contributing much materially to the further development of the [301st] and Psywar.”



NBC employees Robert M. Zweck, David Housman, and Walter D. Ehrhoff of the 406th MRBC reporting to the military induction center in New York on 1 May 1951, the day of the 301st RB&L Group’s federalization.



During WWII, Brigadier General David Sarnoff, Chairman of the Board of RCA and founder of NBC, worked on GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower’s staff and helped rebuild communications in Western Europe. After the war he insisted on being called “General” Sarnoff in RCA’s boardrooms. Sarnoff petitioned the Army to establish the 406th MRBC, which became the MRBC of the 301st RB&L in October 1950.

Unit, Army Field Forces Intelligence School. With COL Gruber still in command, the detachment formed a Special Projects Branch within the school.⁸ These units were further augmented by civilian companies that could form Psywar units in the USAR.

Participating in the Army's post-WWII Industrial Affiliation Program, private sector companies formed reserve units from their pool of existing employees. The program's intent was to have trained personnel available for activation into Federal service. First Lieutenant (1LT) Robert M. Zweck, employee at the National Broadcasting Company (NBC), believed that the Industrial Affiliation Program better prepared the Army for war. When federalized, company-specific reserve units "wasted no time. Guys suddenly took off one set of clothes, put on another, and [they were] ready to go."⁹

LTC Frank A. McCulloch, a WWII veteran of the 34th Infantry Division, worked in the Psywar Division, G-2, Army Field Forces in 1950. He attended the first Psychological Warfare Officers Course in May-June 1951, stayed at Fort Riley to command the 5021st Psywar Detachment, ASU, and later commanded the 301st and 7721st RB&L Groups in Mannheim, Germany.



CPT Robert Asti, a Field Artillery Officer transferred to Military Intelligence and later to the 5th MRBC, was a key member of the Psychological Warfare Division staff and faculty from October 1950 to November 1952.



CPT Robert Asti (facing camera), 5th MRBC commander, in a quarter-ton 4 x 4 truck. The white label on the left rear of the vehicle reads "USFET" (U.S. Forces, European Theater), indicating that this photo was taken after July 1945 when the 5th MRBC had transitioned from Psywar to information control.


David Sarnoff, Chairman of the Board of Radio Corporation of America, founder of NBC, and former general officer assigned to SHAEF during World War II, petitioned the Army to activate the 406th MRBC in the USAR, which it did on 15 November 1948.¹⁰ Captain (CPT) William B. Buschgen, commander of the 406th MRBC, and other employees from NBC drilled monthly in New York City.¹¹ The 406th provided the core of enlisted personnel for the MRBC of the 301st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet (RB&L) Group, activated in the USAR in October 1950.¹² Dated May 1950, Tables of Distribution 250-1201, 250-1202, and 250-1203 provided the template for the 301st RB&L's Headquarters, Reproduction (Repro), and Mobile Radio Broadcasting Companies.¹³ With the 301st established in the USAR, BG McClure received approval to activate the 1st RB&L in November 1950. Consisting of the Headquarters Company, the 3rd Repro, and the 4th MRBC, the 1st RB&L trained at Fort Riley until it deployed to Far East Command (FECOM) in August 1951. The RB&Ls became strategic assets at the Theater Command level.

On 1 September 1950, the Department of the Army published T/O&E 20-77 for the tactical L&L Company. Consisting of a Headquarters section, three platoons (Publications, Propaganda, and Loudspeaker), and eight officers and ninety-nine enlisted soldiers, the L&L became a field army asset like the WWII MRBCs.¹⁴ T/O&E 20-77 allotted each L&L eighteen M38 quarter-ton trucks, nine two and a half-ton "vans," three Davidson Model 221 lithographic presses, two LS-111/UIQ-1 loudspeaker systems, twelve AN/UIQ-1 public address sets, five AN/VRC-10 and two SCR-244 radios. McClure received approval from Army Field Forces to activate the 1st and 2nd L&Ls in November 1950 and the 5th L&L in March 1951 with the necessary equipment, but at reduced strength levels.¹⁵

As Chief of the PWD, Army G-3, BG McClure cooperated closely with the Psychological Warfare Division, G-2, AFF, though he exercised no command or control over it. The Chief of the PWD, AFF, COL Donald F. Hall, had served as commander of the 2679th Headquarters Company, Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB), Allied Force Headquarters and later as the Military Director of the PWB during World War II.¹⁶ Under Hall were WWII Italian campaign veterans Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Frank A. McCulloch, former commander of 2nd Battalion, 135th Infantry Regiment, 34th Infantry Division, and LTC John O. Weaver, former commander of Fifth Army's Combat Propaganda Team.¹⁷ Working together, BG McClure, COL Hall, and their respective divisions spent the rest of 1950 establishing a Psychological Warfare Division and School at the AGS, Fort Riley. This required approval from Army Field Forces.

Commanded by GEN Mark W. Clark, AFF played a key role in the activation of new Psywar units and the establishment of a PWD at the AGS in 1950-1951. In September 1950, LTC Neil M. Matzger, AFF's Assistant Adjutant General, sent a memorandum with supporting documents to MG George D. Shea, Commandant of the

Army General School, 31 March 1951
(T/D* 65-5021-1)



Attached T/D* & T/O&E** Units not included in T/D 65-5021-1

*Table of Distribution (T/D); **Table of Organization & Equipment (T/O&E)

AGS, urging that “the training program in the [Psywar] field must be strengthened and expedited; and the importance of the [Army General School] in that program is obvious.” LTC Matzger warned that the “limited availability of officers qualified as instructors in the field will present a considerable problem in setting up the proposed training and policy center.”¹⁸

Planners from within the Pentagon’s PWD forwarded proposals to the AFF regarding a Research and Development (R&D) program for Psywar equipment, training courses for Psywar officers, and the development of training materials such as field manuals. Additionally, they suggested prerequisites for the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 9305, Psychological Warfare Officer: college degrees and/or experience in fields such as journalism, advertising, applied psychology, history, or political science. On 26 October 1950, LTC Matzger forwarded these proposals to MG Shea. Army Field Forces directed the Commandant to obtain sufficient staff to support those missions as it endeavored “to obtain the assignment of a qualified [Psywar] officer to the [school] to aid in the development of this program.”¹⁹

The effort to build a Psywar division and training program within the AGS fell heavily on a handful of

officers who had WWII Psywar experience and had either retained their commissions in the USAR or rejoined the Army on their own. These officers included CPT Robert Asti and 1LT Frederick C. Schnurr, veterans of the 5th MRBC, and CPT Robert E. Palmer, an intelligence officer. On 21 October 1950, CPT Asti received orders into active military service from the USAR and assignment as a faculty member at the AGS. With no Program of Instruction (POI) in place, Asti met CPT Palmer and 1LT Schnurr at the AGS to write the Psychological Warfare Officers Course.²⁰

GEN Clark appointed LTC Weaver as the Chief of the new Psychological Warfare Division within the AGS. BG McClure forwarded Clark’s request to the Army Adjutant General. In December 1950 LTC Weaver and his staff arrived at Fort Riley to meet Asti, Schnurr, and Palmer, set up the PWD, and finalize the course.²¹ The staff modeled the curriculum on the WWII Psywar training programs at the Military Intelligence School at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, and at nearby Camp Sharpe, Pennsylvania.²² With little else to reference, planners used WWII MRBCs as the basis of the curriculum. Private First Class (PFC) David E. Lilienthal, Jr., recalled that he and the rest of the PWD staff used “materials from WWII intelligence [and] public information sources” to

and noncommissioned officers as part of an on-the-job training program. The Research Branch within the OCPW's Requirements Division compiled assessments from these divisions and later from units in the field.³¹ While McClure envisioned futuristic "new and ingenious devices" (including the "possibility [of a] guided missile capable of circling over an enemy city for a half hour or more, broadcasting propaganda and dropping leaflets"), the Requirements Division made the timely and practical decision to place large orders for the latest "off-the-shelf" technologies with companies such as Harris and Gates.³² From 1951-1953, overseas RB&Ls and L&Ls forwarded assessments of their printing presses, loudspeakers, and radio broadcast systems to the OCPW through their respective theater and field army-level Psywar branches.³³

As the programs for equipment research, procurement, and training accelerated, LTC John O. Weaver, CPT Robert Asti, and other faculty members finished developing the POI for the Psychological Warfare Course. On 17 April 1951, LTC Weaver appointed CPT Asti as Senior Instructor.³⁴ LTC Edward M. Smith, commander of the 5021st ASU's Student Regiment, finalized the official roster of Psychological Warfare Course #1 which contained forty-three officers, mostly from the 1st and 301st RB&Ls. The class roster included LTC Frank A. McCulloch from the Psychological Warfare Division, G-2, Army Field Forces.³⁵

On 2 May 1951 the first six-week Psychological Warfare Course began. BG L.D. Carter, acting commandant of the Army General School, told the assembled body of students, "The graduate of this course will take with him the most complete knowledge and tactical knowhow of psychological warfare ever possessed by an American soldier. It will be his duty to pass on this information and techniques to personnel and to train psychological warfare operational units." BG Carter confirmed that "the Army's specialized training is a natural outgrowth of actual experiences and developments in World War II."³⁶

Heavily reliant upon the lessons of WWII, Psywar modules included Historical Examples; Present Concepts; Psychological Warfare Staff Organization in the Field; Field Operational Units; the RB&L; the MRBC; the Repro Company; the L&L; Types and Phases of Military Propaganda; Propaganda Techniques, Devices, and Themes; and many others, totaling 317 hours of instruction.³⁷ Even in the academic setting, the humor, wit, and sarcasm of the faculty and students shone through. For example, instructors handed out and students were expected to sing the class song, which included the following verses:

*Fare thee well, fare thee well/
We are on our psycho way/
We'll apply the school solution to create superb confusion/
Spreading propaganda-doodle all the day
Fare thee well, fare thee well/
As we draw our clearance pay/
And we reach for our diploma, wars will have a new aroma/
Spread by propaganda-doodle all the day!*

(The security level of the class song was "Constricted."³⁸)



The logo printed on the reception invitation for the first graduates of the Psychological Warfare Officers Course, June 1950. *Quis Est Veritas?* is Latin for "What is Truth?"

The first Psywar School class graduated on 15 June 1951. The number of graduates had dropped from forty-three to thirty-nine students, as Second Lieutenants (2LTs) William F. Brown and Arthur S. Holch and CPTs Edward C. Janicik and Frederick P. Laffey left early for other duties. Held at the Patton Hall Auditorium on Fort Riley, the ceremony's guest speaker was COL Donald F. Hall, former editor of the *Kokomo Tribune* and Chief, PWD, G-2, Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces since 1946.³⁹ Graduates were invited to a reception that evening. The program read:

PSYCHOS, RELAX! *Do you suffer from propaganda fatigue? Have you targets before your eyes? Have your generalities lost their glitter? Have you doubts about your ability to function as a reproduction officer? Are your Tac leaflets dull and poor in color? . . . Then, chum, you've had it. You're historical. You've just finished the first course in Psy War in the History of the U.S. Army. So tonight RELAX! Cease your honorable resistance.*⁴⁰

Captain Robert Asti



Serving in the U.S. Army from 1942-1946 and 1950-1952, Captain (CPT) Robert Asti's military experience revolved around training and leading Psywar personnel. Born in Freeport, Pennsylvania, on 12 March 1916, Asti graduated from the University of Pittsburgh in 1938 and was inducted into the U.S. Army in February 1942. He completed field artillery basic training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Officer Candidate School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in November 1942. He then joined the 731st Field Artillery Battalion at Camp Maxey, Texas.

In August 1943 he transferred to the Military Intelligence School at Camp Ritchie, Maryland. There, "I made contact with personnel of psychological warfare." His own students "recruited me for psychological warfare" and he joined the 5th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC). Operating in Northern France, the Ardennes, the Rhineland, and Central Europe, the unit conducted loudspeaker operations, leaflet drops, artillery

leaflet missions, and broadcasts on *Radio Luxembourg* and *Radio Frankfurt*. After May 1945, the 5th MRBC served under an Information Control Detachment which "controlled publication of German . . . newspapers, radio broadcasting, movies, music, and entertainment throughout the American zone of occupation." Asti left active duty at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, in 1946.

After studying and practicing law from 1946-1950, the former commander of the 5th MRBC returned to active duty: "I was assigned [to] Psychological Warfare for the specific purpose of starting a Psychological Warfare School at Fort Riley, Kansas." As part of LTC John O. Weaver's staff, CPT Asti helped build the Program of Instruction for the Psywar Course and he became the Senior Instructor. Private First Class David E. Lilienthal, Jr. remembered that CPT Asti "was always ready to help and advise anyone in his unit [and] he helped those of us in the fledgling 5th L&L at Riley."¹

After a six-month military internship with the U.S. State Department, Asti served at the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg until fulfilling his service obligation in November 1952. At a time when the U.S. Army had no school or program of training and only one Tactical Information Detachment, CPT Asti was a rare commodity due to his firsthand experience as a trainer and leader of psychological warfare soldiers.²

Endnotes

- 1 Emails from David E. Lilienthal, Jr., to Jared Tracy, 17 March 2011 and 2 June 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 2 Biographical information compiled from personnel documents and Asti's unpublished autobiography, Robert Asti Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

After graduation, the officers either joined the PWD staff, the school faculty, one of the Psywar units (primarily the 1st and 301st RB&Ls), or one of the fledgling psychological warfare staffs at FECOM, European Command (EUCOM), Eighth U.S. Army, or Seventh U.S. Army. LTC McCulloch remained at Riley to command the 5021st Psychological Warfare Detachment, ASU, "a collection point for Psywar personnel" which was established in September 1951.⁴¹ The Psychological Warfare School at Riley continued training officers until its operations moved to Fort Bragg in mid-1952.⁴² On 2 July 1951, the School added a "four-week branch immaterial" Psywar Noncommissioned Officers Course which had been developed by underemployed soldiers and NCOs assigned to an L&L or RB&L at Fort Riley.⁴³

In addition to the Psywar Course at Fort Riley, by February 1952 the OCPW had established Psywar classes at the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Additionally, it had

programmed training for Army personnel in "technical jobs such as photolithography, printing, and specialized signal and electronic duties," sponsored by Harris, Gates, and other companies. The Psywar School also trained USAR units such as the 305th and 306th RB&L Groups.⁴⁴

BG McClure permitted Psywar officers assigned to the Psywar School at Forts Riley and Bragg to attend specialized courses at the Civil Affairs/Military Government (CA/MG) School, Georgetown University, and the U.S. State Department. In October 1951, CPTs Robert Asti and Charles W. Stockwell received orders to Student Detachment, Military District of Washington, D.C. for a six-month temporary duty (TDY) assignment with the International Broadcasting Division, Department of State.⁴⁵ There they received training by the *Voice of America*. LTC Weaver regretted losing Asti even for six months, writing: "Without the obvious advantages both to you personally and ultimately to the School inherent in your new assignment, I would never have agreed to your release from this staff."⁴⁶

Four Psywar officers were scheduled to finish the internship at the State Department in May 1952, although their performance earned praise even before completion. In March, Charles P. Arnot, Acting Assistant Administrator for the State Department's Press Service, wrote a letter to OCPW thanking BG McClure for "the good services rendered to our organization by five officers of your command": CPTs Robert Asti, James S. Mize (who was not technically on orders), Cono N. Carrano, and LTs Eugene Rittenburg and Charles Thodt.⁴⁷ BG McClure told CPT Asti, "It gives me pleasure to transmit to you [Arnot's letter] for the very fine programs on Psychological Warfare as practiced by the Army, which you have presented to personnel of the Department of State. I have heard only good reports of your activities during your period of on-the-job training. I would like to add my congratulations on your outstanding performance." McClure then ensured that the two commendations entered Asti's official 201 (personnel) file.⁴⁸

Arnot's letter influenced the general's decision to transfer CPT Asti to the Training Branch, OCPW, rather than have him return to the AGS as per the prior agreement between OCPW, the Army Field Forces, and LTC Weaver. Weaver, still the PWD Chief at Fort Riley, protested to McClure and reminded him that 1LT Frederick C. Schnurr had returned from the CA/MG School and CPT James S. Mize had returned from Georgetown University. In the process of moving the Psywar School to Fort Bragg as part of the new Psychological Warfare Center, Weaver argued that "the problem is real, and unless corrective action is taken [to return CPT Asti to the school], it will place us in a most embarrassing position." He requested that Asti "be ordered to join our advance party at Fort Bragg immediately upon completing his present tour of duty with the State Department."⁴⁹ Weaver's request was approved, and on 16 May 1952 CPT Asti received orders to report to the Third Army's 3240th ASU, Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina no later than 4 June 1952.⁵⁰

In 1950-1951, COL Donald F. Hall, LTC John O. Weaver, CPTs Robert Asti and Richard E. Palmer, 1LT Frederick C. Schnurr, PFC David E. Lilienthal, Jr., and a few other officers and enlisted personnel helped BG McClure to rebuild the U.S. Army's Psywar capability. McClure had made substantial progress in each of his three main objectives. First, in January 1951 the Army established the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare at the Pentagon. Second, by April 1951, Army Field Forces had approved the activation of five tactical and strategic Psywar units based on existing T/O&Es and T/Ds. Between 1950 and 1952, the AGS housed a PWD and School for Psywar Officers and Noncommissioned Officers. Third, by late-1951 four Psywar units were forward deployed: EUCOM and Seventh U.S. Army in Germany had the 301st RB&L Group and the 5th L&L Company, respectively, EUSA had the 1st L&L, and FECOM had the 1st RB&L.

Despite these successes, McClure still faced challenges. Personnel rotations, particularly in the RB&Ls due to their status as T/D units, hindered continuity and

cohesion. Staffing between the Psywar branches and units shifted frequently because of current mission requirements. And testing, analysis, selection, purchasing, and fielding of new equipment and supplies took time. But by late-1951, the state of U.S. Army Psywar had improved dramatically from what it had been prior to September 1950. ▲

The author wishes to thank David E. Lilienthal, Jr., and Russell and William Asti, sons of CPT Robert Asti, for allowing access to their father's documents and photos.


Jared M. Tracy served six years in the U.S. Army, and became an historian at USASOC in December 2010. He holds bachelor's and master's degrees in history from Virginia Commonwealth University, and has completed a PhD in history from Kansas State University. Current research interests include the history of Military Information Support Operations and military-media relations.

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Leaflets dropped by the Allies on German soldiers in Bitburg, Germany. Tactical and strategic Psywar operations provided the points of reference when the U.S. Army rebuilt its Psywar capability in the early-1950s.



Top Priority RB&L Missions

Radio Tokyo, VUNC, and KBS

by Charles H. Briscoe

Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Homer E. Shields and the 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group (1st RB&L) main body had scarcely gotten their “land legs” back in early August 1951 when Far East Command (FECOM) adjusted their Psywar mission priorities. Since 25 June 1950 Colonel (COL) E. Woodall Greene and his small Psywar staff in the G-2 (Intelligence) had been working nonstop to fulfill Korean War and western Pacific requirements. The 1st RB&L advance echelon (ADVON) that arrived by air in mid-July had dealt with their most pressing missions—UN coverage of Armistice negotiation talks at Kaesong and finding a work place for the 3rd Reproduction (Repro) Company. More challenges awaited, but command guidance from COL Greene was needed.

The G-2 Psywar Division chief made *Radio Tokyo* the top priority for the 1st RB&L. Within that mission was responsibility for the *Voice of the UN Command* (VUNC) because broadcasting originated from *Radio Tokyo* studios. With preliminary negotiations underway to arrange an Armistice, Second Lieutenant (2LT) William F. Brown, II, the UN psywarrior at Kaesong, was the first line of defense against Communist disinformation and propaganda. His daily reports, credited as “a voice close to General (Matthew B.) Ridgway,” became the official UN statement on the daily negotiations.¹ The second priority assigned was to restore *Korean Broadcasting System* (KBS) radio stations to full operation. President Syngman Rhee had his “government in exile” in Pusan because Seoul had fallen twice to the Communists; first, the North Koreans and then the Red Chinese. In early March 1951, the South Korean capital was still dominated by the Communists. Because the *Radio Seoul* station was in enemy hands, *Radio Pusan* (HKLA) with American oversight, became the official “Voice of the Republic of Korea.”

LTC Shields and his staff functionally realigned the group headquarters, redistributing subordinate unit talent to address FECOM priorities. They did this while the Psywar soldiers settled into billets, got oriented, became acquainted with staff procedures, created work areas, and learned their duties. To provide relief to the FECOM

G-2 Psywar staff, 1st RB&L had to become productive as soon as possible. This article explains how 1st RB&L “Ganders” adjusted to theater Psywar priorities and their new working environments. Articles from the weekly unit newspaper, *The Proper Gander*, contemporary news stories, veteran interviews, U.S. Army field manuals (FMs), official documents, and the 1st RB&L “yearbooks” for 1952 and 2002 provided information.

According to FECOM Psywar priorities, radio broadcast production was to be done by the Group and its 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company. Development of Psywar theme-related leaflets would be done by the 1st RB&L. The campaign proposals and individual leaflet designs were approved by G-2 Psywar and printed *en masse* by the 3rd Repro for air or artillery delivery. The Group S-3 split media production into Radio and Leaflet Sections. Signal Corps Captain (CPT) Edward C. Janicik, the S-3, supervised WWII veteran Armor First Lieutenant (1LT) Elwin D. Hatfield, Leaflet Officer, and Anzio veteran Infantry CPT Robert A. Leadley, the 4th MRBC commander, who was dual-hatted as Radio Officer. Pressure to field the 1st RB&L, get officers trained in Psywar, and deploy the unit overseas left little time to practice collective tasks and solidify staff assignments. Fortunately, a good number of 1st RB&L lieutenants and captains were WWII veterans with commercial radio, television, advertising, and press experience. They understood that shifting priorities meant some internal reorganization to accomplish missions.² It was a different story with the enlisted personnel.

1st RB&L broadcast script writers to support *Radio Tokyo* programming and *Voice of UNC* had to be centralized. The Group Headquarters & Headquarters Company had a small complement of radio script writers by its T/D (Table



COL E. Woodall Greene, Chief, G-2 Psywar, Far East Command.




Miss Bok Cha Kim, a Korean actress, made propaganda broadcasts to Communist troops on *Voice of the United Nations Command* (VUNC).



Republic of Korea (ROK) President Syngman Rhee.

Facing page: LTC Homer E. Shields with MG Paik Sun-yup, ROK I Corps Commander.

Organization of the 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, February 1953



Doctrinally, a Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group had three companies: an HHC (Headquarters & Headquarters Company); a Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC), and a Reproduction Company (Repro). The headquarters had four traditional staff sections: S-1 (personnel), S-2 (intelligence), S-3 (operations), and S-4 (logistics).



CPT Edward C. Janicik, the 1st RB&L Operations Officer (seated right), discusses a leaflet proposal with (L to R): 1LT Elwin D. Hatfield, Chief, Leaflet Section, retired Nationalist Chinese Brigadier Zeng-tse Wong, Department of the Army civilian, 2LT Roy A. Gallant, S-3 Section, and 2LT Frank R. Mickelsen, Chief, Leaflet Art.

of Distribution) dated 18 July 1950. This amounted to a Sergeant First Class (SFC) chief script writer and three script writer Sergeants (SGT). All had the same MOS (military occupation specialty): 0288.³ The majority of the script writers were in the Programming Section of the 4th MRBC under the direction of CPT Frederick P. Laffey. Since the situation in Korea had not stabilized sufficiently to move the MRBC there from Japan, the simple solution was to attach all script writers to the Radio Section. Enlisted soldiers with journalism degrees were summarily detached from the 3rd Repro. Script writers assigned to *Radio Tokyo* moved into the programming department to learn production, draft propaganda messages and news reports, and develop as announcers.⁴


The adjustment was not difficult since the Americans paid for air time on *Radio Tokyo* of the *Japan Broadcasting System (JBS)* and the Army Adjutant General (TAG) had been assigning experienced personnel to the 1st RB&L. The TAG team at Fort Myer, VA, had been screening records of activated Reservists, National Guard, and two-year draftees to cull out copy writers with top newspaper and magazine experience, college journalism graduates, “lay-out experts from the advertising field, and authorities on radio and television” broadcasting.⁵

The 4th MRBC script writers detailed to the Radio Section included Privates First Class (PFC) Paul B. Sorensen, George Menkart, Vincent R. Marcley, Alvin R. Busse, Leon H. Califf, John L. Stoddard, and Frank E. Wilson and Private (PVT) Kenneth V. Benson. 1LT Robert B. Shall was made the Production Officer. Signal Corps 2LT Calvin J. Sing, a WWII veteran who spent 1946-47

WWII combat infantry officer CPT Robert A. Leadley was dual-hatted as Group Radio Officer and the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) commander.



Far East Command, GHQ Psywar Section,
1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, 1951




Based on FECOM G-2 Psywar guidance, radio broadcast production was to be done by the Group and its Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company. Psywar leaflet production would be managed by the Group. LTC Homer E. Shields made the S-3 (Operations) the most robust of his primary staff sections. The Radio and Leaflet Sections were supported by the Information & Education and Linguistics Sections. As depicted in the schematic, the Radio and Leaflet Section organization resembled a mix of commercial radio, advertising, and newspaper divisions.

with the *Field Radio for Peking*, took charge of the Linguist Section for Chinese and Korean media.⁶ University of Illinois journalism graduate (Class of 1951) PFC Charles R. Broderick, a recent U.S. Navy-trained lithograph pressman from 3rd Repro, was sent up from Motosumiyoshi to write broadcast scripts for a long six months.⁷

Rationale for the Radio Operations reorganization and Korea broadcast duty rotations was provided by CPT Janicik, the Group S-3: "The creative writers and technicians of Radio Operations need...actual field experience in the combat area so that their work can be more accurate and effective. Conversely, it is important for [MRBC] Korea personnel

to gain experience in Tokyo, programming, writing, and producing Psywar programs. The quality of work will be greatly improved by this on-the-spot orientation method."⁸ This explanation was printed in *The Proper Gander* to keep everyone informed concerning command decisions.

Whether it was apparent at the time the 1st RB&L was being "melded" into the G-2 Psywar Division. The assignment of American career Department of Army civilians (DACs), English-speaking Japanese, and Japanese, Chinese, Korean, and Russian linguists and artists (temporary DACs and contract employees) further amalgamated the Psywar unit into FECOM headquarters.⁹



SGT George Menkart (center), 1st RB&L radio producer, goes over scripts with Korean actors in the studios of *Radio Tokyo* during a "mike-rehearsal."



Radio script writers, SGT John Stoddard, 2LT William Eilers (on phone), and SGT Lee Nelson transform media information into powerful radio documentaries and news commentaries.



The S 3 Operations Research Section provided script writers with summaries of Communist problems for propaganda exploitation in their mimeographed weekly *Research Review*.

The assignment of the RB&L to GHQ Headquarters Service Command (HSC) for administration and logistics completed the process. The FECOM staff shuffling did not impact on the internal reorganization which made the Group S-3 the dominant staff element.

The S-3 Radio Section assumed responsibility for all *Radio Tokyo* programs, including *VUNC* within weeks. They "got their feet wet" with programs from 9 P.M. until midnight. 1LT Alvin S. Yudkoff and the Commentary and Special Features Section soldiers wrote radio news commentaries, turned interviews into scripts, and presented book reviews of current bestsellers. They got a weekly mimeographed *Research Review* from the Operations Research Section. The *Review* contained short summaries of unfavorable Communist activities collected by the Radio Monitoring Section.¹⁰ Mr. Clarence A. Davies, a DAC, edited radio scripts produced by CPL Robert Herguth, PFCs William F. Morton and Donald I. Burns, and PVT Hanno Fuchs. Davies worked at the *Tokyo Advertiser* for five years before WWII and in the Office of War Information (OWI) in Honolulu during the war. PVT Chuck Broderick worked for Davies from August 1951 until January 1952. The "News Desk Officer," Infantry 2LT Eddie Deerfield, had PFCs Anthony E. Severino and William L. McCorkle writing daily fifteen-minute news bulletins.¹¹ Why the UN Command had to establish *VUNC* is explained in the sidebar.

Meanwhile, part of being integrated into the FECOM staff meant the 1st RB&L would grow in size. By 4 October 1951 the Psywar Group had been augmented by forty-five civilians, American, Chinese, Korean, and Japanese, in the Empire House and Motor Pool. Former Army Reserve Master Sergeant (MSG) Alexander "Al" Liosnoff, a University of Missouri graduate of the School of Journalism (Class of 1942), who had worked for CBS, St Louis, and broadcast for several radio



Radio script writers at work in the Empire House, 1951: L to R: PFCs Anthony E. Severino, William F. Morton, James McCrory, and SSG Robert Herguth.



2LT Alvin Yudkoff, unknown translator, and SGT Robert Herguth turned English scripts into top network caliber Chinese and Korean programs broadcast as *Voice of the United Nations Command (VUNC)* from Studio 19 in *Radio Tokyo*.

“The UN in Korea”

The United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK) evolved from the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) which was supposed to oversee free and fair elections after WWII. The Soviets denied access to North Korea.¹² UNCOK had been sent to watch for trouble and attempt to unify the peninsula. They broadcasted several appeals to North Korea in response to the hostile, abusive output of *Radio P'yongyang*. But, the General Assembly had instructed them “to avoid any hint of controversy or provocation.” A final appeal on 11 May 1950 went unanswered.¹³ As surprised as everyone by the invasion on 25 June, UNCOK did call for an immediate end to the fighting that evening from *Radio Seoul* before evacuating to Japan two days later.¹⁴

After returning to Pusan in July, the three members spoke weekly to assembled South Korean audiences stressing UN support and activities to repel the aggression. *United Nations Radio* in New York was carried to Korea by *Voice of America*. While UNCOK statements were sometimes incorporated in Psywar leaflets, the commissioners took no part in planning field activities. Selection of Psywar themes was the responsibility of the UN Commander.¹⁵

When victory in Korea seemed assured, the UN General Assembly established a UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) on 21 October 1950. Chinese intervention upset this effort. Hesitant, passive action morphed into maintaining a diplomatic presence.¹⁶ The commissioners established contact with 1st RB&L in Tokyo and its Psywar detachments at the South Korean radio stations, furnishing UN information materials.

But, invitations to make broadcasts went unanswered and a representative attended only one session of the FECOM G-2 Psywar Strategy Planning Group. UNCURK press releases were turned over to the FECOM Public Information Office (PIO).¹⁷ Hence, the 1st RB&L was tasked to establish the *Voice of the UN Command* (VUNC). An UNCURK information team attended the Armistice negotiations, but only as correspondents for the UN headquarters in New York. UN Command did not consult UNCURK on its strategy and decisions for Kaesong and Panmunjon. Thus, 2LT William F. Brown, II, 1st RB&L Advance Echelon, became the official “voice close to General [Matthew B.] Ridgway,” the UN Commander, at Kaesong.¹⁸

stations in San Francisco after WWII, was recalled to active duty in 1950 and sent to FECOM G-2 Psywar. After his two years of active duty, Mr. Liosnoff was assigned to the 4th MRBC as a DAC. Miss Lauve Keister, secretary to LTC Shields, had been the assistant editor of the *Textile Technology Digest* before joining civil service. Ten Japanese typists, four illustrators, and five drivers were assigned.¹⁹ The Chinese and Korean drawing styles of Liang Ying Min and Kim Kyo Tek proved more believable to Asian audiences than those of the Americans.²⁰ This influx of civilians was followed shortly by the arrival of the “Gander” Rear Detachment in mid-October—another seven officers and sixty-three men accompanying the organic equipment.²¹ Now, the 1st RB&L had the personnel, printing presses, and mobile radio vans to become fully operational.

By early 1952 almost 100 radio broadcasts—the “impact medium” of Army Psywar—were originated from Tokyo each week. These were written in English and then translated into Chinese and Korean by Linguistic Section personnel. An average of forty-five man hours went into each broadcast program. The 1st RB&L writers and producers prepared the radio programs, carefully balancing daily news with educational specials, music, and drama. Truthful, accurate news was the backbone of the programming. Dramatic news commentaries were developed to promote understanding and improve “target audience” retention.²² The “Ganders” worked the Psywar themes hard.

Sentimental references to home and family attracted more broadcast appeal when done by women. Korean and Chinese actresses and actors were hired as broadcasters and commentators. Professional stage actress Bok Cha Kim, Ophelia in a prewar production of *Hamlet*, was best known in North Korea as disc jockey *Mo Ran*. Her fifteen minute nostalgic “platter and chatter” program was pre-recorded in the same studio used by *Tokyo Rose* during WWII. “Lansa” was her Chinese counterpart. The Chinese actress adopted this (“Flowering Grace” in Mandarin) because she still had family in Peking.²³ Whereas the radio broadcast was the final product of script writers, the Psywar leaflet and weekly news sheets came from the S-3 Leaflet Section.

Writer PFCs Morris J. Brown and Richard L. Berry, working with 2LT Roy A. Gallant, drafted Psywar leaflet



L to R: SGTs Anthony E. Severino, Donald Burns, Don Newman, and William Morton with two unidentified 1st RB&L radio script writers transformed information into powerful documentaries and news commentaries.



Actress Margaret An (left), and actors Yang Hong, Jin Wui, and Tuk Yen broadcast the news in Chinese from the *Radio Tokyo* studios, April 1952.



WWII Armor veteran, 1LT Elwin D. "Hat" Hatfield, S-3 Leaflet Section chief, had served as a reporter, copy writer, and editor on several Oklahoma newspapers.

texts, while PFC Gerald P. "Gander Meanders" Deppe did weekly news leaflets.²⁴ This *Free World Weekly Digest* contained information on the progress of the war as well as regional and world events.²⁵ "Since I had quickly learned to tell if Chinese characters were right side up, I was in charge of 'posting' the weekly Chinese newsletter...right side up," said PFC Peter R. Lee.²⁶ The leaflet section chief was Armor 1LT Elwin D. "Hat" Hatfield, a WWII Pacific veteran (Philippines and Okinawa). The former courthouse-police reporter and sports editor of the Muskogee (OK) *Phoenix*, copy reader for the Oklahoma City *Times*, and assistant city editor at the *Daily Oklahoman* insured that 1st RB&L writers, artists, and linguists crafted "products that would cajole vicious Reds into surrendering." Hatfield accomplished this in "the slow, easy going drawl that worked with reporters on the *Daily Oklahoman*."²⁷

The 1st RB&L aimed Psywar leaflets at North Korean civilians as well as Communist Chinese and Korean troops. The weekly Psywar news sheet explained UN progress in the war and world events. Safe Conduct Passes containing specific surrender instructions and simple maps to Allied front lines were designed to lower enemy troop morale and reduce combat effectiveness. Fifty-eight to eighty-six man hours were required to produce each propaganda leaflet.²⁸ Good living and working conditions in Tokyo made these workloads quite bearable. Hence, the shift in mission priorities was almost seamless.

Duty as a Psywarrior in Japan was not bad. The Empire Building (the former British Embassy) was just blocks from General Douglas A. MacArthur's headquarters in the Dai Ichi. The entire sixth floor of the Empire Building belonged to 1st RB&L. Plenty of new furniture and an abundance of fans provided a conducive working atmosphere. The building snack shop, with a constant aroma of fresh coffee, seemed destined to inspire "many a fine piece of work from the Operations' competent staff."³⁰ Enlisted "Ganders" could ride a military bus or walk to work if the weather was nice.

The 1st RB&L soldiers were housed in the earthquake-proof, five-story brick and tile-roofed Finance Building. The square-shaped imposing structure had a triple-arched portal in which a GHQ Honor Guard soldier was posted. An inner court was used for Honor Guard formations. The GHQ Headquarters & Service Command (HSC) offices were located on first and second floors. Not everyone appreciated life in Tokyo.

"We live in a big squad room with about 20 men and it's fairly nice. It isn't safe as far as stealing is concerned because there are all kinds of troops in the building and they roam all over the place," wrote PVT Charles Broderick. He had been pulled from his 3rd Repro Company press job to write broadcast scripts (his first assignment at Fort Riley).³¹ "We sit in here [Empire Building], and knock out a story or two every 3 or 4 days. I am rapidly running out of ideas. I have at least 15 examples of work they've used. As a consequence I could do the work in civilian life. I just sit and thump away on my 'L.C. Smith' [typewriter]," lamented the former collegiate football player.³² However, the majority of "Ganders" in the Japanese capital enjoyed their Psywar experience. It was far better than a combat assignment overseas in Korea.

On 19 October 1951, the S-3 Radio Section was praised by LTC Thomas O. Mathews, FECOM G-2 Psywar Radio Officer, for programming, script content, and style qualities: "Output has reached a new high in 'listen-



SSG John A. Davenport and SGT Gudmund Berge of the 1st RB&L Leaflet Section combined terse, dramatic word messages with attention-getting, graphic images.



The 1st RB&L headquarters occupied the sixth floor of the Empire Building on Avenue A in Tokyo.



The 1st RB&L enlisted soldiers were billeted in the Finance Building which housed the GHQ Headquarters Service Command. General Douglas A. MacArthur's GHQ Honor Guard company lived there as well.



The Peers Club was the BOQ for captains. Field grade officers lived in another facility.



The Yuraku Hotel served as the BOQ (Bachelor Officer Quarters) for lieutenants and warrant officers.

1st RB&L Tokyo Buildings and Billets



The Far East Air Force headquarters, Meiji building. Photo taken circa 1950s.



Palace Gardens. Photos taken during the Korean War reconstruction period 1953-54.



Finance Building, also the GHQ Raiders and 1st RB&L enlisted living quarters.



The Diet, Japan's parliament building.



Places F shot



GHQ SSI



Far East Command SSI



General Headquarters (GHQ),
Dai Ichi Building.



Ginza Street, a heavily patronized shopping area.



Imperial Hotel designed by Frank Lloyd Wright.
Photo taken during the Korean War reconstruction
period 1953-54.



Radio Tokyo

CPL Charles R. Broderick circled locations photographed on this period map of U.S. facilities in and around Tokyo in 1951. Highlighted in insets are representations of some of the places Broderick shot.

ability.' Well-written material, variety of programs, special recordings from Korea, and smooth production are adding to effectiveness" at *Radio Tokyo*.³³ This laudatory note showed that the 1st RB&L reorganization enabled the unit to successfully accomplish its primary FECOM mission within sixty days of arrival in Japan.

Reorganizing along commercial advertising and journalism lines, applying the unit's best talent to *Radio Tokyo* and *VUNC*, and co-locating the 3rd Repro with the FECOM Printing and Publications Center at Motosumiyoshi inadvertently facilitated the amalgamation of the Psywar Group into the FECOM staff and print center. By mid-January 1952, the 3rd Repro Company was attached to the 8234th Army Unit (AU), the new designation for the FECOM print facility and the 1st RB&L had been redesignated as the 8239th AU. With the redesignations Far East Command assumed responsibility for organizing, manning, and equipping the temporary Army Unit. The Department of Army (DA) had fulfilled its obligation by getting this critical asset into theater.

Only the tactical Psywar units, the Loudspeaker & Leaflet Companies to support theater armies had been created by the Army as permanent elements with Tables of Organization & Equipment (T/O&E). They remained in the Army force structure after the war when the temporary elements were easily deactivated by the theater



PFC Thomas M. Klein, Operations Research Section, studying "China Today," while SGT Donald I. Burns types the radio script of the day.



Copies of the *Free World Weekly Digest* were airdropped over North Korea.



CPT Robert A. Horn, Chief, 1st RB&L Operations Research Section, contrived the "Next New Year Will You Be Alive?" theme for this Psywar leaflet. It suggested that the target might be dead, wounded, or missing by then. Mr. Liang Ying Min did the Chinese illustration while Mr. Kim Kyo Tek tailored it for the North Koreans.²⁹

LTC Homer E. Shields, Military Police Corps (MPC)

Homer Edward Shields was born in Columbus, Indiana, on 25 March 1915. Attending Arsenal Technical High School in Indianapolis, he joined the Reserve Training Corps. After graduating at the height of the Depression (June 1933) when work was scarce, Shields joined the 38th Infantry Division (38th ID), Indiana National Guard (NG). Just before promotion to Corporal in late 1934, he was hired by the Indianapolis *Times* circulation department. With war raging in Europe, Africa, and Asia in March 1940, the division Headquarters Company First Sergeant accepted an Infantry Second Lieutenant (2LT) commission. When the 38th ID was federalized on 17 January 1941, 2LT Shields became a Reserve Officer [AUS (Army of the United States)]. Several staff assignments at Fort Hayes near Columbus, OH; Camp Van Dorn, MS; and Camp Joseph T. Robinson, AR; preceded the Infantry Division Course at the Command & General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, KS in late 1943. In April 1944, Major (MAJ) Shields was a Psychological Warfare (Psywar) officer in Unit 1, 2679th Psywar Battalion (Provisional) in North Africa. At the end of October 1944, MAJ Shields, assigned to the 6822nd Psywar Detachment, SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces), was attached to 6th Army Group to perform combat propaganda for the 7th U.S. Army and the First French Army. He was awarded the Bronze Star for his wartime work. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Shields served as Executive Officer to Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure, Chief, Information Control Division, SHAEF, from 25 May 1945 until September 1945 when he returned to the States for separation.


After his release from active duty in December 1945, Shields returned to the Circulation Desk at the city *Times* in Indianapolis. He rejoined the military in September 1947 after receiving an appointment as an Infantry LTC in the Indiana National Guard to be the Headquarters Commandant. In February 1949, LTC Shields was dual-hatted as Provost Marshal, 38th ID and Headquarters Commandant before attending the Military Police (MP) Advanced Course at Camp Gordon, GA, in August 1949. When he branch transferred from

Infantry to MP in September 1950, LTC Shields had already reverted to inactive status to resume a sales career with the Economy Electric Supply Company.

Discontented with sales he had just completed a two-week school to become Safety Director at Camp Atterbury (Indiana National Guard) when BG McClure, the recently designated Army Chief of Psychological Warfare, called him from Washington. McClure offered him command of the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (RB&L). Shields immediately requested three years of active duty (AD) as a Psywar Officer. Headquarters, 5th U.S. Army in Chicago approved "twenty-one consecutive months of AD

or more." Back in uniform on 12 February

1951. LTC Shields spent three days TDY (temporary duty) with General McClure in the Pentagon (Room 3C370). On 21 February 1951, LTC Shields took command of the 1st RB&L. Administratively, he was assigned to 5021st ASU (Army Special Unit), the Army General School holding detachment where Army Psywar personnel reported.³⁴



LTC Homer E. Shields

commanders. As the war wound down in 1953, these T/D units simply withered away as the two years of active duty ended for Army Reservists and enlisted draftees; FECOM elected not to replace most departing personnel. Whether LTC Homer Shields was aware of these force structure nuances is of little consequence. His ability to challenge them was negligible and besides, the WWII Psywar veteran had to address radio broadcasting issues in Korea, his Number Two priority. ▲

Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and the Lodge Act.

Endnotes

- 1 William F. Brown, II, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 27 September 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 2 Eddie Deerfield, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 16 September 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; "Operations Shuffle Changes S-3 Set-up," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 16, 18 August 1951, 1, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, Tokyo, Japan, Charles R. Broderick Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as *The Proper Gander* with date and collection; **Field Artillery 2LT William F. Brown II was made the Group S-2 (Intelligence) by LTC Homer A. Shields shortly after his arrival. He was forthwith dispatched to the Pentagon to be briefed on Yugoslavia. When LT Brown returned the Princeton graduate and former Look magazine writer joined a group preparing Psywar classes and developing Programs of Instruction (POI) for the officer and enlisted Psychological Warfare Courses at the Army General School, Fort Riley. He was attending the Psywar Unit Officer Course No. 1 when drafted for the 1st RB&L Advance Echelon (ADVON) to Japan. Brown interview, 27 October 2010; On 19 October 1951, the 4th MRBC Radio Section supporting the Far East Command (FECOM), G-2 Psywar Section was praised by MSC LTC Thomas O. Mathews, for the quality of programming, script content, and style. U.S. Army, General Headquarters (GHQ), Far East Command, Psychological Warfare Section memorandum, SUBJECT: Commendation for 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company dated 19 October 1951.**
- 3 Army Field Forces. Table of Distribution (T/D) 250-1202, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group dated 18 July 1950, Robert L. Darcy Collection, U.S. Army Heritage & Education Center, Carlisle, PA, hereafter cited as T/D 250-1202, Darcy Collection.
- 4 Deerfield interview, 16 September 2010; "Operations Shuffle Changes S-3 Set-up," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 16, 18 August 1951, 1, Broderick Collection.
- 5 Paul M.A. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare* (Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 1954), 306; "Ideas in Action," *Stars & Stripes* (Tokyo) undated, James B. Haynes Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by collection. **By 1950s Psywar doctrine using radio frequencies of established stations and alerting prospective audiences about programs by public address systems, posted leaflets, and airdropped newspapers could offset the numbers of receivers available. U.S. Army (Field Manual) FM 33-5, Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations dated August 1949, 61.**
- 6 Deerfield interview, 16 September 2010; "Operations Shuffle Changes S-3 Set-up," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 16, 18 August 1951, 1 and "Don't Get Blinded! Mickelsen, Sing Wearing Silver Bars," *The Proper Gander*, 1: 22 (4 October 1951), 1, Broderick Collection.
- 7 Charles R. Broderick, interviews by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 27 October 2010 and 3 November 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 8 "Tokyo-Korea Traffic Heavy With Groupers: Radio Ops Keep Men Between Japan-Korea," *The Proper Gander*, 1:27 (8 November 1951), 1, Broderick Collection.
- 9 Deerfield interview, 16 September 2010; "Operations Shuffle Changes S-3 Set-up," *The Proper Gander*, 1:16 (18 August 1951), 1, Broderick Collection; 1st RB&L Group, *Life and Times in the First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group 1952* (Tokyo, 1952), hereafter cited as *1952 Life and Times*; Broderick interview, 3 October 2010. **CPL Broderick was tasked to write up local sports and entertainment events, like the "Powder Puff Football Game," visiting jazz artists, and the ongoing combat in Korea based on Army teletype reports and POW interrogations which were classified SECRET. GHQ Headquarters (Dai Ichi building) had a good library for regional research.**
- 10 Deerfield interview, 16 September 2010; "Operations Shuffle Changes S-3 Set-up," *The Proper Gander*, 1:16 (18 August 1951), 1, Broderick Collection; Broderick, interview, 3 October 2010; Operations Research Section, 1st RB&L Group, APO 500. *Research Review*, 2:1 (2 January 1953), 1, Darcy Collection.
- 11 Deerfield interview, 16 September 2010; "Operations Shuffle Changes S-3 Set-up," *The Proper Gander*, 1:16 (18 August 1951), 1, Broderick Collection; Broderick, interview, 3 October 2010.
- 12 "UNTOK" at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UNTOK> accessed 8/16/2011.
- 13 Leon Gordenker, "United Nations Use of Mass Communications in Korea, 1950-1951," *International Organization*, 8:3 (August 1954), 333.
- 14 Gordenker, "UN Use of Mass Communications in Korea," 1950-1951," 333, 334.
- 15 Gordenker, "UN Use of Mass Communications in Korea," 1950-1951," 337.
- 16 Gordenker, "UN Use of Mass Communications in Korea," 1950-1951," 338, 339.
- 17 Gordenker, "UN Use of Mass Communications in Korea," 1950-1951," 340, 344.
- 18 Brown interview, 27 September 2010; Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*. United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC, US Army Center of Military History, 2005), 21.
- 19 "Group Now Has 45 'Honorary' Members," *The Proper Gander*, 1:22 (4 October 1951), 4, Broderick Collection.
- 20 Peter Lee, "Personal Remarks," in Klein, McConaughy, and Anthony E. Severino, *Remembrances of the 1st RB&L Group: 57th Year Reunion, October 24, 2009*, 1, hereafter cited as *57th Year Reunion*.
- 21 "Goslings See Frisco; Blue Pacific, On Trip," *The Proper Gander*, 1:24 (18 October 1951), 1,2, Broderick Collection.
- 22 SB, "New Weapons, Complementing Bombs and Bullets Go Forth to Wage A War With Words," GHQ Headquarters and Service Command's Weekly Publication, *The Reporter*, 2:28 (11 April 1952), 3; and "Ideas in Action," *Stars & Stripes* (Tokyo), undated from Broderick and Haynes Collections.
- 23 Peter Kalischer, "We're Asking the Reds to SURRENDER – PLEASE," *Collier's* (13 December 1952), 15,16.
- 24 Deerfield interview, 16 September 2010; "Operations Shuffle Changes S-3 Set-up," *The Proper Gander*, 1:16 (18 August 1951), 1, Broderick Collection.
- 25 "Ideas in Action," *Stars & Stripes* (Tokyo), undated Haynes Collection.
- 26 Lee, "Personal Remarks," in *57th Year Reunion*.
- 27 "Officer of the Day: Newspaperman Hatfield Directs Leaflet Work," *The Proper Gander*, 1:22 (4 October 1951), 2,4, Broderick Collection; Thomas M. Klein, "Elwin Hatfield (1922-1991)," 2002 *Life and Times*, 180-183. **1LT Elwin Hatfield visited prisoner of war (POW) camps near Pusan and Seoul in late October 1951 to gather information that might be useful in further leaflet production. While in Korea, he joined MAJ William H. Buckley, the 1st RB&L Group executive officer on a leaflet drop. "Cramped, Cold and Weary Officers Return to City," *The Proper Gander*, 1:25 (25 October 1951), 1, 3 and "Leaflet Chief Off: LT Hatfield Leaves for Korean Visit," *The Proper Gander*, 1:24 (18 October 1951), 2, Broderick Collection.**
- 28 SB, "New Weapons, Complementing Bombs and Bullets Go Forth to Wage A War With Words," *The Reporter*, 2:28 (11 April 1952), 3 and "Ideas in Action," *Stars & Stripes* (Tokyo), undated, Broderick and Haynes Collections.
- 29 General Headquarters. Far East Command. Psychological Warfare Section. 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, APO 500. Psywar Leaflet #1140 "Will Death Be Your Fate?" dated 28 December 1951, Haynes Collection; "LT Horn Man Behind 'Fate' Theme Leaflet," *The Proper Gander*, 2:2 (17 January 1952), 1, Broderick Collection.
- 30 "Headquarters, 4th Live in Big House, with Elevators Yet!" *The Proper Gander*, 1:16 (18 August 1951), 1, 3, Broderick Collection.
- 31 Broderick letter from Tokyo to The Brodericks, Marion, Illinois, dated 11 October 1951, Broderick Collection; Peter Lee, "Personal Remarks," in *57th Year Reunion, October 24, 2009*, 22.
- 32 Broderick letter from Tokyo to The Brodericks. Marion, Illinois, dated 11 October 1951, Broderick Collection.
- 33 U.S. Army, General Headquarters (GHQ), Far East Command, Psychological Warfare Section memorandum, SUBJECT: Commendation for 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company dated 19 October 1951. **MAJ Matthews and CPT Max W. Dolcater had gotten Radio P'yongyang back on the air as a UN station in mid-November 1950, only to destroy their handiwork when the Communist Chinese intervened en masse a few weeks later.** Charles H. Briscoe, "The UN Occupation of P'yongyang," *Veritas*, 6:1, 77.
- 34 COL Homer E' Shields, U.S. Army 201 (Personnel) file, courtesy of Timothy Shields, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Klein, "Colonel Homer Shields (1915-2000)" in *2002 Life and Times*, 123-129.

Major General Robert A. McClure

by Jared M. Tracy



BG Robert A. McClure as
Chief of the Psychological
Warfare Division,
Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Expeditionary
Force, 1945.



Major General (MG) Robert Alexis McClure, a persistent advocate for psychological warfare (Psywar) and unconventional warfare (UW) from World War II to the Korean War, is an icon in the history of U.S. Army Special Warfare. To honor his contributions over a thirty-nine year military career, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command named its headquarters building for him in January 2001, and the U.S. Special Operations Command inducted him into the Commando Hall of Honor in October 2010.¹ The Psychological Warfare Center that McClure pushed the Army to establish in 1952 is today's U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the primary training center for Special Operations soldiers. This article highlights MG Robert A. McClure, the officer who most solidified the role of Psywar, Special Operations, and Special Forces in the U.S. Army.


Born in Mattoon, Illinois, on 4 March 1897, Robert A. McClure moved with his family as a young boy to a farm in Madison, Indiana, near the Kentucky border.² He graduated from the Kentucky Military Institute, a preparatory school in Lyndon, Kentucky, in 1915. In August 1916, he accepted a commission as a lieutenant in the Philippine Constabulary, a militarized Filipino police force established by the U.S. Army after the Spanish-American War in 1898. Led by U.S. officers, its mission was to conduct counterinsurgency operations.³

Accepting a Regular Army commission in August 1917, First Lieutenant (1LT) McClure did not deploy to France during World War I.⁴ He served with the 31st Infantry Regiment at Fort William McKinley, Philippine Islands, until November 1917 before transferring to the 15th Infantry Regiment in China. Since January 1912 that unit had been guaranteeing rail access to the port of Chinwangtao from Tientsin and Tongshau.⁵ Notable alumni of the 15th in China included future Generals (GEN) George C. Marshall, Joseph W. Stilwell, Earle G. Wheeler, Charles L. Bolte, and Matthew B. Ridgway.⁶

Post-WWI demobilization caused the Army to downsize significantly.⁷ In the smaller interwar Army, career officers formed close relationships as they moved from command to staff positions and to the service schools. Those professional bonds were beneficial as they established reputations though, as historian Alfred H. Paddock, Jr. points out, promotion in the peacetime Army was "excruciatingly slow."⁸ Fifteen years as a lieutenant or captain was not unusual between the wars.

In 1920, Captain (CPT) McClure returned to the Philippines to serve with the 27th Infantry Regiment "Wolfhounds" in Manila before reassignment to the 19th

An enthusiastic horseman, CPT McClure demonstrates his skills at an equestrian demonstration at Fort Benning in 1928.



Captain McClure with his wife, Marjory, and two sons, Robert D. (l) and Richard A. (r). Born in 1920, son Robert graduated from West Point in 1943 and retired as a colonel from the U.S. Air Force. Richard was born in 1924, graduated from West Point in 1947, and retired as a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Air Force.





A military liaison in London since 1941, BG McClure walks with British King George VI shortly before Operation TORCH, late-1942. McClure's experience as Chief of the Information and Censorship Section, Allied Force Headquarters in North Africa and the Mediterranean, prepared him for his role as Chief, PWD/SHAEF from April 1944 through the end of the war.



15th Infantry Regiment DUI



29th Infantry Regiment DUI

Infantry Regiment at Camp Sherman, Ohio, a training post for draftees in WWI.⁹ In January 1921 he became the Post Exchange officer.¹⁰ In October 1922 he escaped to the 29th Infantry Regiment at Fort Benning, Georgia, home of the Infantry School.¹¹ The 29th gave practical demonstrations to large classes of officers on all phases of infantry training and field exercises. Commanding the regimental headquarters company, McClure described it as "the most desirable assignment I have had."¹²

Interspersed with troop assignments was Army schooling.¹³ McClure graduated from the Infantry School in June 1925 and the Troop Officers Course at the Cavalry School, Fort Riley, Kansas, in June 1926. MG R.H. Allen, Chief of Infantry, extended his congratulations to CPT McClure for graduating from the Cavalry School as an Infantry Officer, calling it "of real importance to the Infantry and to the service."¹⁴ McClure also completed the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in 1932 and the Army War College in Washington, D.C., in June 1936.¹⁵ Typical of outstanding students, he was selected to instruct at the Infantry School and War College after graduation. CPT McClure had also been a Professor of Military Science and Tactics at Riverside Military Academy in Gainesville, Georgia, between schools.¹⁶

The war in Asia and Europe would have a major impact on McClure. When the United States declared war on 8 December 1941, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) McClure was serving as Assistant Military Attaché in London. There he interacted with Allied heads of state and senior military leaders. After becoming senior Military Attaché to the American Embassy in late-1941,

he was assigned liaison duties with the "Governments in Exile" (Greece, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Belgium, and Norway). Rapid promotions accompanied those additional responsibilities (LTC to Brigadier General [BG] in nineteen months—August 1940 to March 1942).¹⁷ Then-LTC Albert C. Wedemeyer from the Plans Division in the War Department General Staff wrote to McClure's wife: "[BG McClure] knows how to handle the people with whom he is associated, exercises great tact, and is a bundle of energy."¹⁸

In preparation for the forthcoming Operation TORCH, Lieutenant General (LTG) Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed BG McClure as Chief, Information and Censorship Section (INC) of the Allied Force Headquarters in December 1942.¹⁹ The INC's Psywar Branch "laid many of the foundations on which the [Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (PWD/SHAEF)] later [built] a much larger and more intricate structure."²⁰

From "somewhere in Africa," McClure assumed responsibility for Allied publicity and censorship in the Mediterranean Theater.²¹ In a letter to his wife, Marjory, McClure wrote:

*[The INC operates] 12 high powered radio stations . . . My Psychological Warfare Staff—radio, leaflet, signals, front line, occupation, domestic propaganda personnel, exceed 700. In censorship—troop, mail, and cables, civilian mail, radio, press, cables, telephone for all of North & West Africa, Sicily . . . over 400 personnel & supervising 400 French. Public relations—press and correspondents—150 correspondents—250 personnel—a total "command" of 1500 in an organization never contemplated in the Army.*²²

McClure led the INC until 13 November 1943 when GEN Eisenhower made him Chief of the Publicity and Psychological Warfare (P&PW) Division working for the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander. In February 1944 P&PW became a staff directorate, the G-6.²³

On 13 April 1944 Eisenhower divided the G-6 into two separate divisions: BG Thomas J. Davis headed the publicity division and BG McClure headed the PWD/SHAEF.²⁴ McClure coordinated propaganda efforts with the American Office of War Information (OWI), the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and the British Ministry of Information and Political Warfare Executive.²⁵ As head of the PWD, the general coordinated airdrops of more than three billion leaflets over German military units and throughout the rest of Europe from June 1944 to May 1945. On the continent, mobile radio broadcast companies and Broadcasting Stations Operating Detachments provided loudspeaker and short-range radio support to advancing Allied units, complementing McClure's strategic leaflet campaign.²⁶

During WWII, the significant effect of Psywar was lost on many military officers. One senior officer in SHAEF thought



BG McClure (upper left), Chief of INC, confers with British censor COL Scott Bailey in January 1943 while others of the Censorship Branch inspect documents for sensitive information.



BG McClure and other staff members of the Information Control Division after the deactivation of the PWD/SHAEF in July 1945.

that “tactical propaganda, that is, leaflets, loudspeakers [is] useless.”²⁷ Even before the end of hostilities, BG McClure needed to emphasize that Psywar supplemented UW and conventional warfare.²⁸ Having oriented the PWD toward occupation duties, BG McClure shifted entirely from Psywar to information control in May 1945.²⁹ When SHAEF ceased to exist on 14 July 1945, the general became Chief, Information Control Division (ICD), U.S. Forces, European Theater.³⁰ According to First Sergeant (ISG) Orlene M. “Jackie” Voelkl, Women’s Army Corps, the ICD “took over all of the [German] newspapers and the radio stations” while assuming its “new role in the de-Nazification of occupied Germany.”³¹

The ICD’s objectives were to shut down all “media of public expression in Germany”; take over operations of radio transmitters, newspapers, and other media; and eventually grant licenses “to carefully selected anti-Nazi, democratic-minded Germans.”³² McClure wanted to ensure that Germans rejected Nazism completely.³³ He said, “We are not going to lose the peace by giving [media] licenses to racialsists, Pan-Germans, Nazis and militarists so they can . . . attack democracy as Hitler did.”³⁴ He believed that anti-Nazi, anti-Communist Germans should be directly involved in the re-orientation of Germany.³⁵

Despite PWD/SHAEF’s effectiveness in WWII, the “ignorance, among military personnel, about psychological

warfare, is astounding,” wrote BG McClure.³⁶ He argued that the Army needed to retain its Psywar capability. Some senior officers agreed. MG Lyman Louis Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believed that the Army should “develop a psychological warfare capability for the future” and “provide future commanders and staff officers with [an] understanding and appreciation of this new weapon of warfare.”³⁷ Still, the Army did not maintain Psywar as a peacetime capability.

Throughout the late-1940s, BG McClure diligently petitioned fellow senior officers to restore the Army’s Psywar capability.³⁸ McClure’s repeated requests stalled because of GEN Eisenhower’s (Chief of Staff of the Army [CSA]) deference to James V. Forrestal, secretary of the newly created Defense Department. Nothing materialized, and Psywar faded away.³⁹ In 1947 BG McClure became Chief of the New York Field Office, Army Civil Affairs (CA) Division under MG Daniel Noce. Among other responsibilities, the CA Division handled information operations conducted by military government units in occupied Germany, Austria, Japan, and Korea.⁴⁰ From the New York branch, BG McClure directed the “reorientation and reeducation” of those countries, much as he had done as head of the ICD in Germany immediately after the war.⁴¹

BG McClure organized the New York Field Office to oversee periodicals, films, radio broadcasts, books, and other forms of cultural expression in the occupied countries.⁴² In June 1948, McClure wrote to the *New York Times* editor:

Military governments . . . have opened approximately sixty United States Information Centers to place before the native populations American books, magazines and newspapers, thereby broadening the outlook of these peoples . . . Approximately fifteen U.S. newspapers and seventy-five U.S. magazines are subscribed for and sent [to] each center. The demands of the thousands who visit these centers cannot be fully satisfied.⁴³

McClure performed CA duties until January 1949 when he became Assistant Division Commander of the 4th Infantry Division, Fort Ord, California.⁴⁴ Later that year the general assumed command of Vancouver Barracks, Washington. This old frontier post at “the western terminus of the Oregon Trail” had earlier been commanded by WWII Army Chief of Staff, GEN Marshall.⁴⁵ While stationed in the American Northwest, BG McClure kept up his letter-writing campaign proselytizing Psywar.

The North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 prompted Secretary of the Army Frank Pace and GEN J. Lawton Collins (CSA) to take action. MG Charles L. Bolte, the Army G-3 (Plans and Operations), temporarily recalled BG McClure to the Pentagon to discuss rebuilding a Psywar capability. At the urging of Secretary Pace, the G-3 created a Psychological Warfare Division (with McClure as its head) in September 1950.⁴⁶

In January 1951, the PWD became a special staff element under the U.S. Army Chief of Staff. GEN Collins made BG McClure the Chief of the Office of Psychological Warfare (OCPW).⁴⁷ Its mission was “to formulate and develop Psychological and Special Operations Plans for the Army . . . and to recommend policies for and supervise the execution of [Army] programs in those fields.”⁴⁸ It consisted of Psychological Operations (or Propaganda), Requirements, and Special Operations (or Special Forces) Branches.

As the most qualified active duty officer to rebuild U.S. Army Psywar, McClure’s first priority involved creating and fielding Psywar units. By the spring 1951 the Army staff had activated the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company, the 2nd L&L, the 5th L&L, and the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group. It had also federalized the 301st RB&L, a reserve unit from New York.⁴⁹ Second, Army officers and soldiers required schooling in Psywar. McClure established a special division within the Army General School (AGS) at Fort Riley, Kansas, for that reason. The first Psywar officers course graduated in June 1951, and class cycles continued until the establishment of the Psywar School at Fort Bragg in 1952.⁵⁰

Third, Psywar units had to have the latest technology. The OCPW’s Requirements Division and later the Psywar Board conducted research and development. Those departments evaluated the latest commercial “off-the-shelf” radios, loudspeakers, and printing presses, and customized them for use by Army Psywar field units.⁵¹ The OCPW and the Psywar faculty at Fort Riley coordinated with the Gates Radio Company in Quincy, Illinois, to have students receive additional training on assembling, disassembling, repairing, and transporting radio towers. In a matter of months, BG McClure and his OCPW had overseen the activation of numerous Psywar units, established a training school for Psywar officers and soldiers at Fort Riley, and had procured the latest technologies for use by field units.

The war in Korea had made rebuilding the Psywar capability a priority. In addition, BG McClure recruited some WWII veterans with knowledge of guerrilla tactics to address Special Operations within OCPW’s Special Operations Branch. Individuals such as LTC Russell W. Volckmann and COLs Wendell Fertig and Aaron Bank developed plans and training methods for OCPW’s Special Forces Concept. Bank, a WWII OSS operator, was selected by McClure to command and train a Special Forces Group (SFG) when OCPW received approval to activate one.⁵² LTG Samuel V. Wilson, a WWII veteran of the OSS and Merrill’s Marauders, recalled that McClure “was an excellent judge of talent, chose good men to work for him, gave them their charge, and stepped back to watch them carry it out.”⁵³ Another challenge faced McClure: the AGS lacked appropriate staffing and Fort Riley lacked the facilities to accommodate both Psywar and UW students and courses.

This situation prompted BG McClure to campaign in the Pentagon for a separate Army Psychological Warfare Center to teach students, develop Psywar and Operations



BG McClure as the new Chief of the New York Field Office, Civil Affairs Division, 1947. This office controlled the distribution of visual and print media to Germany, Austria, Japan, and Korea after World War II.




On behalf of the U.S. Military Government, BG McClure grants media operating licenses to Germans with conditions that broadcasts must not contain pro-Nazi or pro-Communist content.



McClure (third from left) meets with COL Ellsworth H. Gruber (third from right), commander of the 301st RB&L Group, CPT Leroy E. Peck (second from right with arms behind back), commander of the Reproduction Company of the 301st, and other Psywar officers in Germany in 1952.

Psychological Warfare Center, September 1953



The Army Psychological Warfare Center (PWC) organizational breakdown, September, 1953.



Among his many career commendations for overseas service, BG McClure is awarded the Commander of the Order of the British Empire from Field Marshall Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, for his efforts in North Africa and the Mediterranean theaters.

doctrine for the Army, and to address unique equipment needs of Psywar and Special Forces. Departments were established for each and Fort Bragg, North Carolina, became the location for the school. The Army also granted authority to establish an entirely new unit, the 10th SFG. The Psychological Warfare Center, established in May 1952 and consisting of the Psywar School, the 6th RB&L Group, the Psywar Board, and the 10th SFG, proved to be BG McClure's most lasting legacy to Army Special Operations.

By mid-1953, the 10th SFG had expanded from 9 to 1,700 men.⁵⁴ Special Forces units grew throughout the 1950s and some Psywar units remained in the Army after the Korean War.⁵⁵ Fort Bragg and Camp Mackall proved to be excellent training areas. BG McClure had made great advancements for the fields of Psywar and UW from 1950 to 1953. Army Chief of Staff GEN Collins then selected him for a new position based on his wartime diplomatic skills.

In March 1953, GEN Collins appointed BG McClure as Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Iran. Post-WWII instability and the Cold War had led to a tenuous situation in the Middle East. Soviet influence and access to oil were concerns.⁵⁶ As



MG Robert A. McClure, Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Iran, 1953-1956.

Chief of MAAG, McClure advised the U.S.-friendly Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi, Commander-in-Chief of the Iranian armed forces.⁵⁷ The general “formed close associations with the Shah and the Iranian senior military,” and U.S. intelligence reported that “the morale of the [Iranian] security forces has improved, and they can be expected to respond promptly.”⁵⁸ The Shah awarded McClure the silver Homayoun Medal on 29 November 1953. In April 1955, the U.S. Army promoted him to major general. Soon after his promotion, the Chief of MAAG received the Iranian Merit Decoration.⁵⁹ This was McClure’s final assignment.

The Psywar general retired in 1956 after thirty-nine years of service. Chief of Staff of the United States Army, GEN Maxwell D. Taylor, told McClure that “your efforts have added greatly to the effectiveness of the Army and to the security of America. You may well be proud of your record of service to the country.”⁶⁰ Unfortunately, MG McClure suffered a fatal heart attack on 1 January 1957.⁶¹ LTG Samuel V. Wilson recalled McClure as “a quietly engaging, soft-spoken, good-humored, well-read and intellectually curious officer armed with strong moral character and a tenacious sense of purpose.”⁶² 1SG Jackie Voelkl, McClure’s secretary at PWD/SHAEF and the ICD, remembered him as “a delightful man.”⁶³

MG McClure is an ARSOF icon for several reasons. First, as head of the INC and PWD/SHAEF, he led the strategic Psywar efforts in North Africa and Europe during WWII. Second, as Chief of the ICD and the New York Field Office, he led the re-education efforts in occupied nations after the war. Third, after continuous efforts to reinstate U.S. Army Psywar, he finally did so as head of the OCPW during the Korean War. BG McClure orchestrated the activation and fielding of many Psywar units, the creation of a Psywar curriculum within the AGS

at Fort Riley, and the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg with separate training for Psywar and Special Forces. Finally, he had the foresight to convince the Army staff to slate manpower for SF. As such, MG Robert A. McClure was central to the origins of U.S. Army Special Warfare. ♣



**Psywar Center
DUI**

The author would like to thank COL (Ret.) Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., COL (Ret.) Robert D. McClure and his wife Betty Anne, 1SG Orlene “Jackie” M. Voelkl, Dr. Robert Smith at the Cavalry Museum, Fort Riley, and Janice Barnes at the Madison-Jefferson County Library for their assistance while researching this article.

Jared M. Tracy served six years in the U.S. Army, and became an historian at USASOC in December 2010. He holds bachelor’s and master’s degrees in history from Virginia Commonwealth University, and has completed a PhD in history from Kansas State University. Current research interests include the history of Military Information Support Operations and military-media relations.

Endnotes

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- 7 Center of Military History, *American Military History*, 405-406. **In the first full month of demobilization the Army released about 650,000 officers and men, and within nine months it demobilized nearly 3,250,000 without seriously disturbing the American economy . . . [By] the end of [1919] the active Army, reduced to a strength of about 19,000 officers and 205,000 enlisted men, was again a regular volunteer force.**

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- 9 McClure, Career Chronology; Jim Malachowski, "The History of the 27th United States Infantry Regiment 'Wolfhounds,'" http://www.kolchak.org/history/general/history_pg1.htm, accessed 6 April 2011.
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- 14 MG R.H. Allen to Robert A. McClure, 5 June 1926, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
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- 16 Though his career prospects were uncertain, he and his wife, Marjory, made the best of military life. According to McClure's eldest son, COL (Ret.) Robert D. McClure, his parents were equestrians. "In those days [the interwar period], every officer had to have a horse, regardless of the branch he was in," he said. His parents enjoyed riding for leisure and had time to do so in his stateside assignments, especially since polo and horseshoes were also preferred extracurricular activities of U.S. Army officers in that time period. COL Robert D. McClure and Betty Anne McClure interview, interview by Jared Tracy, 22 February 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
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- 18 A.C. Wedemeyer to Marjory McClure, 21 May 1942, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
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- 23 PWD/SHAEF, 7.
- 24 "U.S. Forces in Britain Get a New Press Chief," *New York Times*, 20 April 1944, 7.
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- 29 Robert A. McClure, Chief, Psychological Warfare Division/SHAEF, Press Release, 25 May 1945, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
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- 33 Sandler, *Cease Resistance*, 125.
- 34 Gladwin Hill, "Allied-Soviet Unity Lacking on Germans' Re-Education," *New York Times*, 26 May 1945, 1.
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- 39 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 45-50.
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- 52 Paddock, "Robert Alexis McClure," 7-8.
- 53 Email from LTC Samuel V. Wilson to Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., 17 June 2003, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
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- 57 Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938* (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 148-149.
- 58 Paddock, McClure biography; Paddock, "Robert Alexis McClure," 9; McClure, Career Chronology. When people asked MG McClure later why he got along so well with the Shah, his family remembered him saying "I just treated him like I treated [my son] Bob." COL McClure and Betty Anne McClure interview, 22 February 2011; Central Intelligence Agency, "National Intelligence Estimate: Probable Developments in Iran Through 1954," 10 November 1953, http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000119711/DOC_0000119711.pdf (accessed 1 June 2011), 7.
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The MG Robert A. McClure building, headquarters of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, dedicated on 19 January 2001.



U.S. Armed Forces Radio Stations in Postwar **Japan** and **Korea**


by Charles H. Briscoe

The broadcast van of AFKN Station "Gypsy" (below, left) near Hwach'on contained two short-wave receivers, two dual-speed turntables, an amplifier for live broadcasts, a transmitter, console, microphone, tape recorder, record library of 35,000 popular music hits, and an antenna support. Note the directional "clothesline" antenna.

Psywar did not fill a void in radio broadcasting in Korea during the war. The American military occupation commands had taken control of all media in Japan and Korea. The *Armed Forces Radio Service (AFRS)* followed U.S. forces assigned occupation duty. *AFRS* employed mobile radio vans and commandeered Japanese stations on the mainland, Korea, the Marianas, and the Ryukyus. When Far East Command (FECOM) G-2 Psywar broadcast to Korea from Japan after the war broke out, it was done on the *Far East Network (FEN)* headquartered in the *Radio Tokyo* building.¹

The 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC), 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (RB&L) team was sent to Pusan in August 1951 to take charge of the *Korean Broadcasting System (KBS)* station in the port and to coordinate its refurbishment in order to serve as the "Voice of South Korea." While this was a cooperative U.S.-Korea venture, the American military was clearly in charge, paying reconstruction and equipment replacement costs, and training *KBS* personnel.² U.S. radio operations in Japan began after August 1945.

American radio broadcasting started shortly after General Douglas A. MacArthur and his staff landed at Atsugi on 30 August 1945 to complete the formal surrender arrangements. Two *AFRS* mobile vans, priority shipped from Manila by *FEN*, a.k.a. the "Jungle Network," began broadcasting from Yokohama in early September. For security reasons the mobile *FEN* assets aligned themselves with the American Occupation units. *WLKH* in Kure (Honshu) and *WVTO* in Sasebo (Kyushu) supported the U.S. Army 24th Infantry and 2nd Marine Divisions respectively. The Marines get credit for the first American troop broadcast while the first Army radio station in Japan was *WLKH*.³





Aerial view of the Pusan waterfront, ca. 1953.

4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) personnel sent to Pusan in August 1951 took over the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) station in the port.

NHK (*Nippon Hoso Kyokai*) or the *Japan Broadcasting System*, ceased operations on 10 September 1945 after Emperor Hirohito announced the end of the war to citizens abroad from *Radio Tokyo*.⁴ Less than two weeks later, *Radio Tokyo No. 2* began broadcasts from the building as *FEN* troop station *WVTR*. *FEN Tokyo* established administrative offices on the second floor. Eleven *AFRS-FEN* stations covered Japan, the Marianas, the Ryukyus, and Korea when *WVTP Seoul* was operationally transferred to the Korea Military Advisory Group (KMAG) on 30 June 1949, less than a year before the North Koreans invaded the South.⁵

After hastily deployed U.S. troops and South Korean forces established a final defensive perimeter around the port of Pusan, *AFRS-FEN* shipped WWII-era mobile radio vans to Korea. They became the spearhead of *Armed Forces Korea Network (AFKN)*. *AFRS Seoul* was the first of nine stations established by *AFKN* by the end of 1954. It and three others were semi-permanent and five were 6 x 6 truck-mounted stations. Instead of using radio call letters, the mobile stations chose codenames like "Vagabond," "Gypsy," and "Homesteader." Most *AFKN* stations broadcast 18 hours a day, seven days a week; 50 percent was locally-produced programs and the rest came pre-packaged from *AFRS Pacific* in Los Angeles, CA.⁶

Koreans who understood English preferred to listen to the lively *AFRS* radio programs broadcast for the U.S.

military personnel. They were light, listening entertainment instead of "canned" *Psywar*, *U.S. Information Service (USIS)*, and *Radio Free Asia* programs broadcast in Korean. Despite the proliferation of radio broadcasting in Korea, there was little coordination between the armed services, Department of State, and the quasi-private entities.⁷ The *FECOM* Public Information Officer (PIO) supervised *FEN*, hence the recruitment of Second Lieutenant (2LT) William F. Brown, II, 1st RB&L to serve as the *Psywar* liaison officer effectively linked the two elements.⁸

It was a little different in Korea. 4th MRBC radio detachments oversaw all programming emanating from the *Korean Broadcasting System (KBS)* stations.⁹ The end of Allied Occupation in Japan on 28 April 1952 meant the U.S. had to pay for radio air time and studio leases. That did not happen in Korea until after the Armistice in 1953. ♠

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Endnotes


- 1 H. Jordan Roscoe, "A Brief History of the FAR EAST NETWORK," at <http://jg3.com/fen/history.shtml> accessed 9/14/2011.
- 2 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group. Radio Operations Division. APO 500, Japan. Report on *Psywar* Radio Operations in conjunction with THE KOREAN BROADCASTING SYSTEM August 1951 – March 1952 with Special Section on *Psywar* Coverage of UNCAK Activities in South Korea. USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 3 Roscoe, "A Brief History of the FAR EAST NETWORK."
- 4 "History of NHK International Broadcasting; Overseas Broadcasts in the Prewar and Wartime Period" at <http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/english/info/history.html> accessed 9/14/2011.
- 5 Roscoe, "A Brief History of the FAR EAST NETWORK."
- 6 Roscoe, "A Brief History of the FAR EAST NETWORK."
- 7 Paul M.A. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare* (Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 1954): 272.
- 8 William F. Brown, II, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 27 September 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Roscoe, "A Brief History of the FAR EAST NETWORK."
- 9 Retired LTC Eddie Deerfield, interviews by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 16 September 2010 and 15 September 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.



The cavernous *Radio Tokyo* building was on the edge of Hibaya Park where 1st RB&L soldiers sometimes did field training.

The General Staff System: Basic Structure

Example of Staff Structure



The U.S. Army's staff structure, based on older European models but tailored to support the American military's unique system of command, control, and organization, provides commanders in all units and at all echelons with consistency in performance, responsibility, training, and resourcing. The letter prefix of each staff section reflects the echelon or nature of the staff section. The letter "C" indicates combined (multinational) headquarters, "J" signifies joint (multiservice) headquarters, "G" for division level or above, and, finally, "S" for divisional brigades and lower. Other letters are specific for each of the U.S. service components ("A" for Air Force and "N" for Navy). The numerical suffix designates the function of the particular staff section. Staffs usually contain a minimum of 1 through 6, but can have as many as 1 through 9. The roles of each staff section in the Army command system are:

- **Personnel (G1) (S1).**
- **Intelligence (G2) (S2).**
- **Operations and training (G3) (S3).**
- **Logistics (G4) (S4).**
- **Civil-military operations (G5) (S5).**
- **Signal operations (G6) (S6).**

Staff sections for 7 through 9 are generally not found below the division level. Their functions vary based upon the commander's requirements and may include such functions as Information Operations, Civil Affairs, Resource Management, or Force Modernization.

A commander's Chief of Staff (C of S)/Executive Officer (XO), whose rank depends upon the level of command, supervises the operations of the entire staff, and ensures that it performs consistently with the commander's intent. An Assistant C of S, whose rank similarly depends upon the level of command, heads each of the individual staff sections. In addition to the basic staff, a commander usually has special staff members with unique functions that do not fall under the purview of other staff sections. Some examples of special staff may include Fire Support Coordinator (FSCoord), Engineer Coordinator (ENCOORD), Air Liaison Officer (ALO), and others. The commander also has a personal staff which may include all or some of the following: Command Sergeant Major (CSM), Chaplain, Inspector General (IG), Public Affairs Officer (PAO), surgeon, dentist, and Staff Judge Advocate (SJA).¹

Endnotes

¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 101-5, *Staff Organizations and Operations* (Washington, D.C.: HQDA, 31 May 1997), 2-1—2-5.



HARRIS PRESSES & PSYWAR LEAFLETS

The 3rd Reproduction Company,
1st Radio Broadcasting
& Leaflet Group, 1951-1953

by Charles H. Briscoe

Before the USNS *General A.W. Brewster* docked at Yokohama, Japan, on 6 August 1951, the Far East Command (FECOM), G-2 Psychological Warfare (Psywar) Division had separated the 3rd Reproduction Company (3rd Repro) from its parent 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group (1st RB&L). The Psywar Group staff, the Headquarters & Headquarters Company (HHC), and the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) soldiers in khaki uniforms, combat boots, helmets, load bearing harnesses with butt packs, and carrying their individual weapons, loaded duffle bags into trucks and boarded busses for Tokyo. Three officers and fifty-four men of the 3rd Repro Company did likewise, but they left for the FECOM Printing and Publications Center [8234th Service Detachment (SD) PP&C] in the Kawasaki suburb of Motosumiyoshi, halfway between the Japanese capital and




The Far East Command Printing & Publications Center was located in the seventeen acre Tokyo Koku Keiki Kabushiki Kaisha complex, a major WWII Japanese aircraft instrument manufacturing plant in Kawasaki [Motosumiyoshi suburb] on Route 11 halfway between Tokyo and Yokohama.

Yokohama.¹ The Psywarriors, having learned to be flexible at Fort Riley, Kansas, adjusted to the exigencies of wartime.

Since the 3rd Repro mission was to “process 1st RB&L-produced propaganda leaflets from the ‘dummy stage’ [original leaflet prototype] to printing [photographing to create (‘cut’) lithographic print plates for the presses and printing (‘running’)] and assembly [airdrop bundles and leaflet bombs] for dissemination,” they were incorporated into the existing theater printing and publications center per doctrine.² The FECOM element was located in the seventeen acre Tokyo Koku Keiki Kabushiki Kaisha complex, one of Japan’s top WWII aircraft instrument plants. When the 1st RB&L troops arrived, the print facility was operating a three shift work schedule to fill G-2 Psywar requirements and wartime demand for publications in Korea.³ The arrival of the 3rd Repro press teams was a welcome relief.

The purpose of this article is to explain the 3rd Repro Company Psywar leaflet production process, show what it took to meet daily and extraordinary print deadlines, describe equipment used, and elaborate on individual special skills training. Army field, training, and technical manuals, FECOM and 1st RB&L documents, and official reports are the sources for doctrine, organization, functions and capabilities, missions, and theater employment. Period newspaper articles show how “Ganders” (nickname for 1st RB&L soldiers) increased military and public awareness about what they were doing. Most importantly, 3rd Repro veterans provided reality based on mission accomplishment and circumstances in Japan and Korea as the war evolved.

The 1st RB&L Psywar role changed markedly when the UN mission shifted from driving the Communists out of Korea to restoring South Korea’s northern boundary to *status antebellum* (38th Parallel). Then, negotiations for an Armistice changed the strategic mission. Control of



key terrain in a demilitarized zone (DMZ) that roughly paralleled original boundary lines dominated UN offensive operations. Keeping these contextual factors in perspective, the reader can better understand how the 3rd Repro Company of the 1st RB&L accomplished its missions in support of FECOM. The doctrinal missions of each in the 1950s are the logical start points.

According to the lesson plans of the Psychological Warfare Officers Course (1951) and *Special Text (ST) 33-25-1* (February 1953), *Psychological Warfare Field Operational Units*, a Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group “conducted strategic psychological warfare in a military theater of operations. [Psywar] targets included enemy soldiers and civilians outside the combat area; hostile, friendly and neutral populations under enemy control; and neutral nations.” It was the theater (FECOM G-2) Psywar division that planned and supervised RB&L operations.⁴

The 3rd Repro role in the 1st RB&L strategic mission was to produce leaflets and other printed propaganda material in support of Psywar operations in theater. According to doctrine, three elements determined where a Repro Company would be located: (1) the capability of U.S. Government printing plants in theater to produce Psywar products; (2) the availability of troop billeting nearby; (3) warehouse facilities to store paper and ink supplies and temporarily house finished printed products until pickup.⁵ Though 3rd Repro was a fixed base, non-mobile unit, its equipment was still transportable.⁶ Thus, personnel and organic equipment were assimilated into the daily operations of the FECOM Printing & Publications Center that had been supporting G-2 Psywar since war broke out.

The FECOM Print Plant began supporting the Psywar campaign directed against North Korean forces in early July 1950. First, “Keep the faith, help is on the way” leaflets encouraged the South Korean people. Then, safe conduct passes designed to prompt Communist defections began rolling off the presses. South Korean

and American troops hastily sent from Japan were fighting desperately to maintain a foothold on the peninsula. The desperate situation in Korea dictated aerial delivery.

U.S. Army and Japanese civilian employees at the Motosumiyoshi print facility quickly mastered packing techniques to stack rolls of leaflets into WWII-era M16-A1/2 Cluster Adapter Bombs. These were dropped by Far East Air Force (FEAF) B-26 *Invader* light bombers and B-29 *Superfortress* medium bombers. Each 500 pound bomb could hold 45,000 four-by-five inch or 22,500 five-by-eight inch rolled leaflets. Fully loaded M16A1/2 bombs weighed 170 pounds. The B-29s could carry thirty-two of them.⁷ The alternate 100 pound M-26 modified flare and M-15 cluster adapter bombs could be packed with seven 1,500 leaflet rolls. The Air Force preferred the 500 pounder. Preset M860 barometric pressure fuses triggered the opening of leaflet bombs.⁸

Less often, rolled leaflets were packed into 105 mm howitzer smoke canister shells.⁹ The carrying space (400 leaflets) and range (8,000 meters) were limited, but pinpoint accuracy, all-weather delivery, and the ability to coordinate directly with ground forces were advantages.¹⁰ Preceding and following artillery barrages with leaflet shells was a most effective tactic.¹¹ The support of tactical Psywar missions was a requirement. Less than a month after arrival, 3rd Repro assumed the entire FECOM Psywar print mission. Its Processing Section took charge of bomb and artillery shell loading tasks. About the same time 1st RB&L levied its subordinate unit for personnel having journalism backgrounds.


Training, missions, specialized equipment, and soldier life are described by veterans Cecil A. Beckman, the 3rd Repro company clerk, William M. Duke, a pressman, and Charles R. Broderick, who was both a pressman and radio broadcast script writer. The Tokyo edition of the *Proper Gander*, the 1st RB&L weekly newsletter, printed by 3rd Repro, contained articles on unit activities and some soldier biographies.¹² The press training arranged by the



Rolled leaflets are loaded into 500 pound M16A1/2 Cluster Adapter Bombs by 3rd Repro soldiers at Motosumiyoshi, Japan.



SSG Mason, X Corps Psywar, shows how a roll of 400 Psywar leaflets fits in a 105 mm howitzer smoke canister shell.



Master Sergeant (MSG) John K. Ham, Jr., 3rd Repro operates the process copy camera at the FECOM print plant, April 1952.



Sergeant First Class (SFC) Thomas S. Anderson, 3rd Repro "press boss," and CPL Woodrow W. ("William") Venters discuss photo lithography needed for a Psywar leaflet.


Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) in Washington was explained by Broderick.

When Private (PVT) Charles Broderick, a drafted journalism graduate of the University of Illinois, arrived at 1st RB&L headquarters, Camp Forsyth, Fort Riley, Kansas, he was initially assigned as a radio broadcast script writer. Screening conducted by the Army Adjutant General (TAG) Classification & Analysis Station at Fort Myer, Virginia, had provided the Psywar group with an abundance of college-educated draftees with writing skills. Their majors ranged from advertising to applied psychology, history, political science, and journalism. Foreign residence and travel, foreign language proficiency, and experience in newspaper, radio, publication, stage, and motion pictures completed the qualifications list. Requisites for Psywar specialists had come from a small (4 x 7 inches x ¼ inch) Army Field Manual (FM) 33-5 *Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations*, dated August 1949.¹³ However, technical skills like radio repair and print specialties were overlooked. To remedy a shortage of printers the OCPW staff arranged for OJT (On-the-Job Training) on the lithographic offset presses of the U.S. Navy Print Facility located in the basement of the Pentagon.¹⁴ It was up to the 1st RB&L to provide trainees.

PVT Broderick and Corporal (CPL) Duke were among the volunteers. "I figure that since I'll be with the outfit anyhow, I might as well learn something. Since we are still in the formative stages, it's best to get all I can out of this work. There are 6 sergeants, 5 corporals, and 6 PFCs in the printing section so I should get some sort of rank," Broderick told his parents.¹⁵ CPL Bill Duke, an activated Reservist who had been a message center classified courier at Caserta during the post-WWII occupation of Italy, "was already doing OJT at Fort Riley Print Plant, looking to learn a trade."¹⁶

WWII and Korean War veteran, Staff Sergeant (SSG) Thomas S. Anderson, a Regular Army man in the 1st RB&L, was put in charge of the eight "Ganders" (CPL Duke and Privates Broderick, Richard H. Crimer, John C. Frampton, Charles L. Gemmel, Walter J. Gessler, Robert L.

Giesken, and Robert D. Singer) plus six soldiers from the 2nd Loudspeaker & Leaflet (L&L) Company slated for the first OJT press course in



The 3rd Reproduction Company headquarters section performed the supply, clerical, administrative, and command functions. The Camera and Plate, Press, and Processing Sections of the Reproduction Platoon prepared photo lithographic plates, operated the printing presses, and packaged leaflets and news sheets for delivery by airdrop and 105 mm artillery.



CPT Ira J. Harvey (left), WWII 5th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company veteran and Silver Star recipient, was the commander of 3rd Reproduction Company; WWII Pacific infantry veteran 1SG John D. Charlesworth (center) looked like a combination of the actor Burt Lancaster and the Marlboro Man; Phi Beta Kappa 2LT John K. Chance (right) served as the Print Officer.

Washington.¹⁷ In early April 1951 the group was flown to Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and billeted in the Engineer School trainee barracks. The Psywar soldiers were bussed to the U.S. Navy print facility daily. There, they trained on 1940s-era single-sheet Webendorfer 17 x 22 inch drum lithographic presses while SSG Anderson, a trained military photographer, was taught photo lithography.¹⁸

The Offset Pressman Course was conducted when the Navy facility was least busy, late afternoon and evenings. "I've done little except sleep till noon & work from 3 PM till midnight," wrote PVT Broderick. "We handle quite a bit of material that I'm not supposed to talk about but I can tell you about the presses & the set-up."¹⁹ After completing the eight-week Navy course in early June 1951, the Psywar soldiers returned to Camp Forsyth at Fort Riley. The "Ganders" had no time to practice their new skills at the post print plant because the Group was preparing to go overseas. But, they did receive a demonstration of their organic press, the Harris LTV 35 x 45 inch printer.²⁰

Two technical representatives (tech reps) from the Harris-Seybold-Potter Company of Cleveland, Ohio, presented classes to the Psywarriors on the latest four-color 35 x 45 inch offset multi-lithographic printing press. They demonstrated its superior capabilities by producing the initial 1st RB&L four-color Psywar propaganda training leaflet and the only print issue of *The Proper Gander* done at Fort Riley. Volume 1, Number 12 was run on 9 June 1951. Before and after, the unit newspaper was mimeographed until the 1st RB&L got to Japan. This showed the feasibility of such production. LTC Homer E. Shields, the 1st RB&L commander, carried the "While She Waits" leaflet to the Pentagon to show Brigadier General [BG] Robert A. McClure, the Army Chief of Psychological Warfare. After the demonstration, the two Harris tech reps supervised the crating of the LTV press for shipment overseas.²¹

Working with the Group operations and intelligence sections, the 3rd Repro Company produced "While She Waits." It was directed towards a hypothetical audience, the Chinese, and had a nostalgia theme. This project demonstrated the "operational fluency" of several different elements: the script writers, intelligence analysts,

graphic artists, and Repro pressmen, according to LTC Shields.²² The target audience for training was quite appropriate because the 1st RB&L overseas assignment had been changed.

Instead of Europe, the 1st RB&L was headed to Asia. It would be the U.S. Army Reserve [USAR] 301st RB&L, being formed at Camp Forsyth around the NBC [National Broadcasting Company]-sponsored 406th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company [MRBC], that was going to Germany instead. "Virtually all enlisted Reservists in the 301st were sergeants. They all had rank whereas we were mostly privates in the 1st RB&L," recalled PVT Cecil A. Beckman, the soon-to-be 3rd Repro company clerk.²³

The 3rd Repro commander, USAR Adjutant General (AG) Captain (CPT) Ira J. Harvey, a WWII Psywar veteran with a Silver Star and Purple Heart [5th MRBC in Europe] recalled to active duty for Korea, was assigned Beckman as his unit clerk. There was a lot of talent in the small headquarters. CPT Harvey had been print foreman of the Kansas City *Star* and had worked in commercial advertising.²⁴ First Sergeant (1SG) John D. Charlesworth, a WWII Pacific infantry "field first" from Grand Junction, Colorado, looked and acted like a combination of the actor Burt Lancaster and the *Marlboro Man* according to Beckman.²⁵ Second Lieutenant (2LT) John K. Chance, a 1950 graduate of Baldwin-Wallace University [Berea, Ohio] and former editor for the St. Clairsville, Ohio, weekly newspaper, was the Print Officer.²⁶ Company headquarters was set up on the second floor of the central "H-shaped" administration building for the FECOM complex.²⁷

The former WWII Japanese aviation industrial facility covered two city blocks. Staff offices were on the first floor. The officer and enlisted billeting, latrines and shower rooms, mess hall, recreation room and library, all ranks *High-Low Club*, and the 3rd Repro orderly room were situated in the four wings of the second level.²⁸ Security was provided by Military Police (MP).

Soldier life was good. Eight enlisted soldiers shared a room. They slept in bunk beds "decorated" with mosquito netting. Each man had a wall locker and a foot locker by his bunk. CPL Cecil Beckman shared a room with the

first sergeant next to the orderly room. Costs for Japanese kitchen police (KPs), houseboys, and laundry (three-day service) were apportioned monthly based on rank. Outside barber and tailor shops, shoeshine boys waited for business. A Post Exchange (PX) and movie theater were close by. Weekday calisthenics before breakfast became routine as were room and "full field" equipment inspections, road marches, and field training in Hidea Park.²⁹ Post-war Japan was enjoyable for American troops.

The latest stateside movies were also available in Yokohama, a short bus or train ride, and in Tokyo (about an hour by train) at the Ernie Pyle Theater.³⁰ The train station was a half mile from the print plant. The Army enlisted men's club in Yokohama, *The Rack of Four*, was nice, but did not match those in the capital. Class "A" uniforms were worn by soldiers on pass and leave until the Occupation ended on 28 April 1952. When civilian clothes were authorized, enlisted soldiers still had to show passes, ID cards, and "dog tags" (metal identification tags) to the MPs on the gate. The "Ganders" listened to the latest American music, news, and weather on Armed Forces Radio Service (AFRS). Earthquake tremors were quickly taken in stride.³¹ Within a week the 3rd Repro soldiers were hard at work.

Initially, the 3rd Repro was integrated into the daily schedule of the FECOM print facility to familiarize them with equipment and routines. Though their presses had arrived, they stayed crated until the orientation was complete.³² "We printed all kinds of paper products from formal invitations to South Korean (*won*) and U.S. Government MPC (Military Payment Certificates) to leaflets," stated PFC Broderick.³³ "Because the 3rd had a lot of college grads, we had to proof-read military directives before they were printed. With a TOP SECRET clearance I was selected to edit classified materials. Strict handling procedures for atomic bombs was one of these," said Beckman. "While the Print Plant had military personnel and some DACs (Department of the Army Civilians), male and female, the majority of the work force was Japanese. Officers had security clearances, but not all the DACs and sergeants did."³⁴

"Yesterday was our first day on the presses. This plant has a 17 x 22 inch [Harris lithograph press] that is somewhat different [older] than ours, but with a bit of assistance we should be able to operate them all right. Our Press Foreman, Sergeant [SGT] Bob [Robert M.] Jackson is a swell guy and he makes things a lot easier. As of now I work from 2:30-10:30 at night. The press rooms are air conditioned and I pull no other duty of any kind."³⁵ Still, all soldiers pitched in to load the leaflet bombs and packets and put them on trucks to Air Force bases throughout Japan.


By early September 1951, the 3rd Repro was handling the entire G-2 Psywar mission by itself and the FECOM print center returned to a five-day work week, 0800-1700 hours.³⁶ LTC Shields commended the "Ganders" on 23 October 1951 for their "magnificent performances of duty" in the first eleven weeks of operations. CPL Broderick sent the memo and Psywar leaflet No. 1122 with its "Food" theme sheet home.³⁷ At times, copies of the *Proper Gander* served as filler for his letters.

28 December 1951 was an auspicious day for G-2 Psywar when the billionth leaflet was dropped in Korea. It marked eighteen months of Psywar leaflet activity that began 27 June 1950. However, since its arrival on 6 August 1951, the 1st RB&L had written, illustrated, and produced 50 percent of that total. More significantly, over two hundred different leaflets had been prepared by the "Ganders." Included was a stepped-up effort to explain UN humanitarian assistance to the Korean people that began on 1 December 1951. A hundred million simple leaflets in four colors, barely calling card size, had "plugged the UN as the guardian of world peace" for fourteen days. Another "full court press" raised the weekly leaflet "high score" to 65,907,000 dropped between 26 December 1951 and 1 January 1952.³⁸ Unfortunately, this notoriety attracted attention.

Because 3rd Repro had the only publicized combat mission at the FECOM print plant and the Army Staff in Washington considered the RB&L groups as term requirements, changes were forthcoming. FECOM redesignated the 1st RB&L as a theater temporary unit (T/D) by assigning it an Army Unit (AU) number. In mid-January



3rd Repro Company pressmen working the Harris 17 x 22 inch presses at the FECOM print plant.




A 3rd Repro pressman operates a Harris LTV press at the Motosumiyoshi facility, April 1952.



CPL Charles R. Broderick, 3rd Repro Company sent this leaflet home with a note: Here's a typical leaflet. I don't think they're classified but they shouldn't be too widely circulated either.

1952, the 3rd Repro Company was attached to the 8234th AU, the new designation for the FECOM Print & Publications Center. 1st RB&L became the 8239th AU. This subtle distinction allowed the theater command to prioritize personnel fills as the assigned USAR personnel and two-year draftees in the 1st RB&L fulfilled national service obligations and left. Another subtlety was that non-combat efficiency reports in wartime carried little weight for officer promotion and education. Just as 1st RB&L assets had been amalgamated into the G-2 Psywar staff in Tokyo, so would the 3rd Repro leadership at the FECOM Print Plant.

Dual-hatting and consolidation of services followed. The 3rd Repro company orderly room and supply were consolidated with 8234th assets and 1SG Roy Griffie was put in charge. SGT Cecil Beckman was dual-hatted as company clerk and personnel records NCO.³⁹ CPT Harvey was given the additional duty of Assistant Print Officer and relocated into that staff office. 2LT Chance became Reproduction Officer. 2LT Marvin R. Warshaw, the 3rd Repro executive officer, was reassigned to Tokyo as a Psywar staff officer, MOS 9305 [Military Occupational Specialty]. Production of Psywar leaflets was no longer the exclusive domain of the 3rd Repro; the combat mission




3rd Repro offset print men working in the Far East Command Print & Publications Center produce 1st RB&L propaganda leaflets on Webendorfer Offset Lithographic 11 x 22 inch presses.

would be handled like other print jobs, although it did have a higher priority.⁴⁰

There were other internal changes as well. The 3rd Repro was effectively integrated into the FECOM PP&C headquarters command. The new "paratrooper commander, CPT Robinson, conducted a tough inspection of the 3rd Repro troop areas and cancelled passes. Work days now begin with 15 minutes of physical training [PT] at 6:00 A.M. The food is still great and the guys are like always," CPL Broderick wrote home.⁴¹ Within a few weeks, he was again on the "night shift" enjoying a special reveille formation at 10:30 A.M. and missing morning PT. "It's like it was at the Pentagon and Fort Belvoir."⁴² By then, the Harris LTV press was carrying the bulk of the Psywar leaflet load.

CPL Broderick described his daily work routine: "At 6:00 A.M. I was disturbed by the (plant) whistle to fall out for First Call and Reveille, but I went back to sleep till 9:00, skipping breakfast at 6:30-7:30. Lucky me, it snowed all day yesterday. SGT Marvel [FECOM PP&C] who is my night shift boss came around and checked us off his list while we stayed in our bunks. At 2:45, J.C. [SGT John C. Frampton] and I walk about 100 yards, across the street, and inside the door to the press room. He works on a Harris 35 x 45 inch press which is big. And I, of course am still 'thumping along' on the 17x 22 inch Webendorfer Offset Lithographic Process Press. I set a New Year [1952] record last night though. That's 38,000 impressions... about 2 printed sheets every second. Usually I hit about 15,000 per night but the paper was good and that helps a lot. Mostly we get Japanese paper, some of which is made of seashells that cut the printing surface off, so that a [photo lithographic] plate lasts only a short time."⁴⁴

SGT Larry Meyer and University of Minnesota graduate CPL Peter R. Lee, S-3 Leaflet Graphics Section, recalled "overnight suicide runs" down to the printing plant in Motosumiyoshi to deliver mock-ups of leaflets and newspapers as well as the "advanced technology" needed to print perforated cigarette paper leaflets.⁴⁶ All final art



Psywar leaflet #1056 in Korean warned railroad repair workers that U.S.N. F8F Panther fighter bombers would destroy them and their efforts.



approved for reproduction was done in black ink or paint on white paper. Separate, individual drawings were required for each color in the finished leaflet. Then, the final art work and text had to be sized and positioned before being carried down to the print plant.⁴⁷

To spice up his correspondence Broderick used colored sheets of paper, included Psywar leaflets, letterhead paper, and sample print products. "Every time I walk by the Multilith Section where these are printed I pick up some new sheets of anything that would be decent to write on," commented the University of Illinois draftee.⁴⁸ On 11 March 1952 he sent home a copy of the first Psywar multicolor leaflet [FECOM #2506] containing all the United Nations' flags. "We did this on our new LTV Harris! I'm running #3 press at night now and learning an awful lot as we go along."⁴⁹ He had moved up from the Webendorfer press.

Using U.S. Navy Military Sea Transportation Service USNS *Muskingum* T-AK 198 letterhead paper for stationery, CPL Broderick explained that he was not optimistic about an early release. "We'll go as individuals. Replacements will filter in as we leave. Offset men are fairly rare in the Army."⁵⁰ He enclosed a copy of FECOM Psywar leaflet #1056 in Korean that warned railroad repair workers that U.S. Air Force F-84 *Thunderjet* fighter bombers would destroy their efforts. The two-color (black and red on white paper) was part of the 118,000 run on the 17x 22 inch press during Broderick's night shift on 24 April 1952.⁵¹ By then, 3rd Repro draftees were within six months of rotating back to the States.

Though Army personnel rotation from Japan and Korea was based on a point system, expiring terms of service for activated Army Reservists and draftees (two years) determined when soldiers and officers would go home. 1SG Charlesworth, a Reservist, was the first 3rd Repro soldier to leave Japan. His replacement was a Regular Army (RA) non-commissioned officer, 1SG Roy R. Griffie, whose wife accompanied him. They lived on the local economy.⁵² In the midst of personnel turnovers, the operations tempo on the Psywar front had increased.

It was SGT Cecil Beckman that went home by ship from Yokohama via Adak, Alaska, and Seattle, Washington in late October 1952. He out-processed at Fort Meade, Maryland, and was home for Christmas.⁵³ Like Beckman, SGT William M. Duke left Japan by ship in October 1952 to return to the States. Duke was released from active service in early 1953.⁵⁴ They were part of the steady stream of original "Ganders" leaving Japan and war in



CPL Charles R. Broderick sent this United Nations' flags Psywar leaflet #2506 home in a letter.




Korea behind as new replacements filtered into the Far East Command. But, major changes were afoot.

In November 1952, retired General Dwight D. Eisenhower had been elected to replace President Harry S. Truman in January 1953. Armistice negotiations continued fitfully. Army National Guard LTC Homer Shields, the 1st RB&L commander, was extended on active duty until April 1954 and would remain in Japan to lead the ever-changing strategic Psywar effort in Korea.

The Armistice in Korea, statute of limitations on presidential authority to extend Regular Army [RA] enlistments and federalize USAR units and individuals for wartime service, and the typical postwar U.S. military drawdowns had major impacts on Psywar. The expanding Cold War ultimately determined the fate of the Army's resurrected Psywar capability. America's strategic interests in Europe remained foremost.

Creating the three RB&L groups as temporary T/D (Table of Distribution) units had been the quickest and simplest way for the Army to get strategic Psywar "on

The Harris Printing Press and...



The Harris LTV 35 x 45 inch stream-fed offset multi-lithographic press, the most advanced printing machine of its time, could print paper with four different colors without reloading paper between colors or changing photo lithographic plates. Because the 1st L&L was already in Korea, a Harris tech rep came there to uncrate it, assemble the press inside a 2 ½ ton truck van, and train the press men.

The Harris 35 x 45 inch stream-fed offset multi-lithographic press was the “Cadillac” of its time. CPL Charles R. Broderick: “Sergeant John Frampton, the most creative printer ever, who had a real touch for machinery” was sent to the Harris plant in Cleveland, Ohio, to be trained on what became the standard Army Psywar printing press.” Harris LTV presses were shipped directly from Cleveland to Japan for the 3rd Repro and the 1st L&L in Korea. One

was dropped on the Yokohama pier during offloading and declared unsalvageable. A Japanese print company collected up the wrecked press and had it working in three months. After leaving the Army, Frampton worked as a Harris tech rep. “It was such a hot item that General Ridgway (UN & FECOM Commander) came down to the plant to see it in operation.” Compared to the regular drum roll thumping of the Webendorfer presses, the Harris LTV was very quiet.

Unit photo of the 3rd Reproduction Company, 1st RB&L Group, at the printing center in Motosumiyoshi.



1940s Era Color Printing

The four different color [photo lithographic] print plates were aluminum. A gray finish protected the photo impressions that had been burned onto them. Printing a four-color leaflet was a four-step process with a new plate required for each color introduced. As each color was added the press man had to carefully align the stacks of printed paper for the next cycle. Paper quality was always an issue.


Most print paper came on rolls. Sometimes 1st RB&L paper was delivered inadvertently to Korea (see "1st L&L in Korea: A Photographer's Record, 1952-53" by Charles H. Briscoe in *Veritas*, Vol. 3, No. 4 [2007]). Because flat sheets of paper consistently yielded crisp products that stock was set aside for official letterhead paper and invitations. Ink salvaged from a sunken ship was another problem.



1st color, YELLOW.



2nd color, add MAGENTA (red).



3rd color, add CYAN (blue).



4th color, add BLACK.

CPL Charles R. Broderick sent home examples showing how the four step color print process was done to create Psywar leaflet No. 7161. The four color, or CMYK, press laid down cyan (blue), magenta (red), yellow, and black inks in a carefully overlapped progression to create a full color spectrum.

the ground" in Korea and in Europe. But, temporary status as Army Units (AU) meant that they would be the easiest for theater commanders to eliminate when war ended. Deactivation of the 1st RB&L took place in the summer of 1954. The 6th RB&L at Fort Bragg, NC, followed in its wake. The USAR 301st RB&L left Germany in May 1953 at the end of its federalization period. It left the Reserve structure in April 1954. The tactical Loudspeaker and Loudspeaker Companies, created as T/O&E [Table of Organization & Equipment] elements continued into the late 1950s. Army Psywar lost its "champion" in March 1953 when BG McClure was assigned to Iran.

However, for the Korean War Psywar requirements the Army Adjutant General, Army Field Forces Command, and BG McClure's staff accomplished those missions in short order. T/Ds and TO&Es were built, approved, and filled by Department of the Army with qualified, experienced personnel from the Regular Army, Reserves, and National Guard. Pressmen and photo lithographers for the 3rd Repro Company were trained in Washington by the Navy, and orientation training on new commercial print equipment [Harris LTV] was provided to select personnel at the Harris-Seybold-Potter Company plant in Cleveland, OH, and by tech reps at

Fort Riley, KS. Co-locating 3rd Repro with the FECOM print facility was according to doctrine. 3rd Repro provided outstanding Psywar products on schedule throughout its tenure. Award of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Presidential Unit Citation to the 1st RB&L and its subordinate units recognized their valuable contributions. The 3rd Repro Company, 1st RB&L set high standards for subsequent generations of Psywarriors to emulate. ♣



Corporal (CPL) William M. Duke

William M. Duke, born 29 October 1926 in Silver Point, Tennessee, as the first son in a farm family, had three brothers and seven sisters. The Baxter Senior High School graduate was drafted in 1946 and did BCT at Fort Lewis, WA, before going overseas to Caserta, Italy, to be a message center classified courier in Headquarters Command, U.S. Army Mediterranean Theater Occupation. SGT Duke was released from active duty after twenty months. While working with his brother in Michigan, he joined the Army Reserves for the extra money. Activated in January 1951, CPL Duke was assigned to the 1st RB&L. Duke volunteered for the offset printer course at the Pentagon.⁵⁹



Corporal (CPL) Charles R. Broderick

Born 23 September 1928 in Springfield, Illinois, Broderick graduated from Marion Township High School in June 1946 after being class president, football team captain, and the print shop manager. Football displaced academics at University of Illinois (U of I) forcing a year at New Mexico State Teachers College NMSTC to get reinstated. During this sabbatical Broderick played football, worked in the college print shop and was a late night disc jockey at KSIL in Silver City, NM. He graduated from the U of I with a journalism degree in 1951, just in time to be drafted.⁵⁵ Army PVT Broderick did basic combat training (BCT) at Fort "Lost in the Woods" Leonard Wood, MO, and four weeks of heavy weapons training with the 3rd Armored Division before assignment to the 1st RB&L Group at Fort Riley, Kansas. Broderick quickly discovered that there were a lot of college-educated draftees in the unit capable of writing and volunteered for lithographic offset press training in Washington, DC. Charles Broderick was detailed to write radio broadcast scripts in Tokyo for six months before returning to a press at Motosumiyoshi.⁵⁶



Sergeant (SGT) Cecil A. Beckman

Cecil Allen Beckman, the only child of a WWI Navy veteran and U.S. Postal Service worker, was born 22 October 1928 in Washington, D.C., but was raised by grandparents in Buckingham County, Virginia. In addition to being the student body president Beckman was the editor of the Marshall District High School newspaper when he graduated in 1946 and headed to Lynchburg College to study business. He edited the yearbook and was feature editor of the school newspaper until finishing his degree in the summer of 1950. Beckman, drafted for Army service in December 1950, processed at Fort Meade, MD, for BCT at Fort Jackson, SC.⁵⁷ Fourteen weeks was reduced to eight. Afterwards, he was sent to Fort Myer, VA, to the Adjutant General's Classification & Analysis Section to be evaluated for Psywar assignment. Like other college graduates, PVT Beckman was assigned as a script writer, but typists were needed. In Japan, he became the 3rd Repro Company clerk. When the company was integrated into the FECOM Printing & Publications Center, CPL Beckman was promoted to sergeant and became the personnel sergeant for 3rd Repro soldiers.⁵⁸



Sergeant First Class (SFC)
Thomas S. Anderson


Born 21 March 1923 in Chicago, Illinois, Thomas S. Anderson was drafted in February 1944, attended Ordnance BCT, and was sent to the Aleutians. After breaking his leg in February 1945, CPL Anderson was shipped home for hospitalization. While recuperating in Chicago, he became interested in photography. After leaving the service Anderson attended a Commercial and Portrait Photography School with his GI Bill. He reenlisted as a photographer in the Fifth U.S. Army headquarters. Seeking adventure and wanting a change of scenery SGT Anderson volunteered for duty with the U.S. Military Mission in Greece. Instead, he was shipped to the Korea Military Advisory Group (KMAG) in Seoul in November 1949. He was enjoying this assignment until a near miss North Korean mortar round flipped his jeep breaking a leg. Staff Sergeant (SSG) Anderson was medically evacuated to Great Lakes Naval Hospital. Released in January 1951, he was assigned to the 1st RB&L. He became 3rd Repro plant superintendent in Japan. Promotion came 15 September 1951 and Sergeant First Class SFC Anderson returned to the States in April 1952 when his RA enlistment ended.⁶⁰

Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and the Lodge Act.

- 1 The FECOM Printing & Publications Center had absorbed the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) Adjutant General Publications Center in late June 1950. U.S. Army Far East Command. *History of the Far East Command Printing and Publications Center* (Motosumiyoshi, Japan: FECOM Printing & Publications Center, August 1951), 3, 5, 8, 9; "Ideas in Action," *Stars & Stripes* (Tokyo) undated, James B. Haynes Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as the Haynes Collection; U.S. Army General School. Psychological Warfare Division. Psywar Officers Course. PW 4554: Reproduction Company, PW-92-S-1 (1951), Robert L. Darcy Collection, U.S. Army Heritage & Education Center, Carlisle, PA, hereafter cited as the Darcy Collection.
- 2 *History of the Far East Command Printing and Publications Center*, 3, 5, 8, 9; "Ideas in Action," *Stars & Stripes* (Tokyo) undated, Haynes Collection; U.S. Army Field Forces, Fort Monroe, VA. T/D 250-1202, Reproduction Company, Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, dated 18 July 1950, Darcy Collection.
- 3 *History of the Far East Command Printing and Publications Center*, 3, 5, 8, 9. The FECOM Printing & Publications Center [8234th Service Detachment (SD)] was redesignated the 8234th Army Unit (AU) on 4 February 1951.
- 4 T/D 250-1201 Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group dated 18 July 1950; U.S. Army Psychological Warfare School. *Special Text (ST) 33-25-1, Psychological Warfare Field Operational Units* (February 1953), 1-2, hereafter cited as ST 33-25-1.
- 5 ST 33-25-1.
- 6 U.S. Army General School. Psychological Warfare Division. Psywar Officers Course. PW 4554: Reproduction Company, PW-92-S-1 (1951), Darcy Collection.
- 7 *History of the Far East Command Printing & Publications Center*, 8, 9; Stephen E. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950-1953* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1991), 37.
- 8 The M860 barometric fuses were set to explode at approximately 1,000 feet. The drop point needed to be upwind from the burst point which was also upwind from the target area. HQ, 1st RB&L Group. Fort Riley, KS, Unit Training Program. Phase II. Psychological Warfare, 3 April – 16 April 1951, Darcy Collection.
- 9 "Army Psychological Warfare," *Officers' Call* (Washington, DC: Department of Army, Public Information Office, 1952): 9.
- 10 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group. Fort Riley, KS. Restricted Lesson Plan: Psychological Warfare Operational Units, Darcy Collection.
- 11 Pease, *PSYWAR*, 40.
- 12 3rd Reproduction Company, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group. Announcement: Press Debut of *The Proper Gander* in Keith H. McDaniel Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as McDaniel Collection.
- 13 Department of the Army. Field Manual FM 33-5 *Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations* (August 1949), 78-80. This field manual also specified fourteen subjects on which Psywar specialists should be trained. This was the basis for the Program of Instruction (POI) for the Psywar Officer and Enlisted Courses conducted at the Army General School at Fort Riley, KS, in 1951-1952.
- 14 Charles R. Broderick, interviews by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 27 October 2010 and 3 November 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; Robert W. Jones, Jr. and Charles H. Briscoe, "The 'Proper Ganders': 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group: Strategic Psywar in Korea, 1951-1954," *Veritas*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2011, 28-29.
- 15 Broderick letter to The Brodericks, Marion, Illinois, dated 3 April 1951, Broderick Collection. Charles Broderick was "right on the money" with his 3rd Repro Press Section rank and numbers. There were seventeen enlisted men: a sergeant [Sergeant First Class (SFC)] as press foreman, five other sergeants (SGT), five corporals (CPL), and six privates first class (PFC). U.S. Army General School. Psychological Warfare Division. Psywar Officers Course. PW 4554: Reproduction Company, PW-92-S-1 (1951), Darcy Collection.
- 16 William M. Duke, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 4 October 2010, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 17 Duke interview, 4 October 2010; William (Bill) Duke, biographical sketch in Thomas M. Klein, Robert Herguth, and Robert McConaughy, *Psychological Warfare in Korea: 1952 Life and Times in the First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group: 50 Years Later 2002* (Smyrna, GA: Round Hill Productions), 167, hereafter cited as *Life and Times 2002*.
- 18 Broderick interviews, 27 October 2010 and 3 November 2010; "Repro's Anderson with KMAG When Invasion Came," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 25, 1, 2, 25 October 1951, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, Tokyo, Japan, Broderick Collection.
- 19 Broderick letters to The Brodericks, Marion, Illinois, dated 13, 20 and 22 April 1951, Broderick Collection; Navy Department, Bureau of Naval Personnel Service Schools Offset Pressman Course (3167) Certificate dated 8 June 1951, Broderick Collection.
- 20 Broderick interviews, 27 October 2010 and 3 November 2010. The Table of Allowances (T/A) for a Reproduction Company in a Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group Table of Organization & Equipment (T/O&E) was to have four offset presses capable of printing sheets as large as 17 x 22 inches at a rate of 7,000 per hour. The Publication Platoon of a Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company had four Davidson presses that could print up to 10 x 14 inch sheets at the rate of 4,000 per hour. U.S. Army General School. Psychological Warfare Division. Psywar Officers Course. PW 4554: Reproduction Company, PW-92-S-1 (1951), Darcy Collection.
- 21 "Harris Corporation – Company History" at <http://www.harris.com/company-history.html> accessed 6/6/2011, "Harris Corporation Marks Its 110th Anniversary," at http://www.harris.com/view_pressrelease.asp?act=lookup&pr_id=1740 accessed 6/6/2011; "THIRD REPRO PRESSMEN get the lowdown on the new 'baby,' the \$11,000 Harris offset press," *The Proper Gander*, (Friday, 8 June 1951), Vol. 1, No. 12, 1, Herbert Asti Collection, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as the Asti Collection. Printing *The Proper Gander* weekly became a secondary mission for the 3rd Reproduction Company after tech reps demonstrated the capabilities of the Harris-Seybold-Potter LTV stream-fed multi-lithograph press at Fort Riley, KS in June 1951. 3rd Reproduction Company, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group. Announcement: Press Debut of *The Proper Gander*, McDaniel Collection.
- 22 "First Leaflet Produced by Group," *The Proper Gander*, (Friday, 8 June 1951), Vol. 1, No. 12, 3 Asti Collection.
- 23 Cecil A. Beckman, biographical sketches of John D. Charlesworth and Ira J. Harvey for Klein, Herguth, and McConaughy, *Life and Times 2002*, 156, 179-180; Beckman interviews, 30 September 2010 and 1 October 2010. Before and during WWII, company first sergeants in garrison were Master Sergeants, E-8, while field first sergeants were Sergeants First Class (SFC), E-7. Their sleeve insignia had five chevron stripes (three stripes up and two rockers below) with a diamond in between. In the post-WWII years the first sergeant rank insignia became three stripes up and three rockers below with a diamond.
- 24 Beckman interview, 30 September 2010.
- 25 Beckman interview, 30 September 2010.
- 26 Beckman, biographical sketches of John D. Charlesworth and Ira J. Harvey, *Life and Times 2002*, 156, 179-180.
- 27 Beckman interview, 1 October 2010; "Air-Conditioned Shop, Heat-Conditioned Men: Third Repro Rolls," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 16, 18 August 1951, Broderick Collection.
- 28 Beckman interview, 1 October 2010; "Air-Conditioned Shop, Heat-Conditioned Men: Third Repro Rolls," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 16, 18 August 1951, Broderick Collection.
- 29 Beckman interview, 1 October 2010; "Air-Conditioned Shop, Heat-Conditioned Men: Third Repro Rolls," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 16, 18 August 1951, Broderick Collection.
- 30 CPL Sandy Zane, "More Than Movies Found at Lush Pyle Theatre," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 27, 3, 8 November 1951, Broderick Collection. The Ernie Pyle Theater, designed by architect Abe Mikishi, was built in 1933. Known as the *Takarezuka Geikije* before the war, it was as modern and functional in design as any structure in Tokyo and the acoustics in the several theatres were perfect for music.
- 31 Beckman interview, 1 October 2010.
- 32 "Air-Conditioned Shop, Heat-Conditioned Men: Third Repro Rolls," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 16, 18 August 1951, Broderick Collection.
- 33 Beckman interview, 1 October 2010.
- 34 Beckman interview, 1 October 2010.
- 35 Broderick letter from Yokohama to The Brodericks, Marion, Illinois, dated 10 August 1951, Broderick Collection.
- 36 Beckman interview, 1 October 2010.

- 37 Broderick letter from Tokyo to The Brodericks in Marion, Illinois, dated 23 October 1951, Broderick Collection; GHQ. FECOM Psychological Warfare Section. 1st RB&L Group, APO 500. MEMORANDUM to All Officers and Enlisted Men, 1st RB&L Group, 8239 AU, APO 500 dated 23 October 1951; GHQ. FECOM Psychological Warfare Section, 1st RB&L Group, Korean "Food Theme" leaflet No. 1122 dated 23 October 1951.
- 38 "Billionth Leaflet Dropped," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. II, No. 2, 1, 17 January 1952, Broderick Collection; SB, "New Weapons, Complementing Bombs and Bullets Go Forth to Wage A War With Words," GHQ Headquarters and Service Command's Weekly Publication, *The Reporter*, Vol. 2, No. 28, 11 April 1952, 3, Broderick Collection.
- 39 Jim Craft, "What Hoppen...? Third Repro Merges with Printing Plant," "Personnel Changes Hit Group," and "Repro Officer Chance Joins Third at FECPPC," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. II, No. 2, 1, 3, 17 January 1952, Broderick Collection.
- 40 Craft, "What Hoppen...? Third Repro Merges with Printing Plant," "Personnel Changes Hit Group," and "Repro Officer Chance Joins Third at FECPPC," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. II, No. 2, 1, 3, 17 January 1952, Broderick Collection.
- 41 Broderick letters from Yokohama to The Brodericks in Marion, Illinois, dated 5 & 22 January 1952, Broderick Collection.
- 42 Broderick letter from Yokohama to The Brodericks in Marion, Illinois, dated 22 January 1952 in Broderick Collection.
- 43 Broderick interviews, 27 October and 3 November 2010.
- 44 Broderick letter from Yokohama to The Brodericks in Marion, Illinois, dated 2 February 1952, Broderick Collection.
- 45 Broderick interviews, 27 October and 3 November 2010.
- 46 Larry Meyer and Peter Lee, "Personal Remarks," in *Remembrances of the 1st RB&L Group: 57th Year Reunion*, October 24, 2009, 20, 21.
- 47 "Graphics Has Big Job in Leaflet Production," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 22, 4 October 1951, 1, 4, Broderick Collection.
- 48 Broderick letter from Yokohama to The Brodericks in Marion, Illinois, dated 26 February 1952, Broderick Collection.
- 49 Broderick letter from Yokohama to The Brodericks in Marion, Illinois, dated 11 March 1952, Broderick Collection.
- 50 Broderick letter from Yokohama to The Brodericks in Marion, Illinois, dated 13 April 1952, Broderick Collection.
- 51 Broderick letter from Yokohama to The Brodericks in Marion, Illinois, dated 25 April 1952, Broderick Collection.
- 52 Beckman interview, 1 October 2010.
- 53 Beckman interview, 1 October 2010.
- 54 Duke interview, 4 October 2010.
- 55 Broderick interviews, 27 October 2010 and 3 November 2010.
- 56 Broderick, interviews, 27 October 2010 and 3 November 2010.
- 57 Beckman interview, 30 September 2010.
- 58 Beckman, biographical sketches of John D. Charlesworth and Ira J. Harvey, *Life and Times* 2002, 156, 167, 179-180.
- 59 Duke interview, 4 October 2010; William (Bill) Duke, biographical sketch in *Life and Times* 2002, 167.
- 60 "Repro's Anderson With KMAG When Invasion Came," *The Proper Gander*, Vol. 1, No. 25, 1, 2, 25 October 1951, Broderick Collection.

Private Charles R. Broderick was awarded this certificate for completing the eight week OJT U.S. Navy Offset Pressman Course on 8 June 1951 (Broderick Collection).





Commander, USASOC
ATTN: AOHS (*Veritas*)
E-2929 Desert Storm Drive
Fort Bragg, NC 28310

Upcoming Articles...

ARSOF in the Korean War: Part V

The next issue of *Veritas* will cover the full spectrum of Psywar to include the operations of the 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, the establishment of *Radio Pusan* and the activities of the antenna riggers who erected and maintained the systems. The riots in May 1952, observed by the Psywar soldiers in Tokyo, marked the end of the U.S. occupation in Japan. In this photo, leaflets are disseminated from a C-47 aircraft over Korea.

